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To assist that process, the present study assesses the changing landscape of 
agricultural protection or taxation patterns in the ECA region. It is based on a sample of 
eleven Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries (the ten new EU members (Bulgaria 
and Romania joined on 1 January 2007, following eight that joined in May 2004, namely the 






In a recent survey of European economic growth since 1950, Crafts and Toniolo (2008) 
conclude that incentive structures are a crucial explanator of comparative growth rates of the 
economies of east and west Europe. Pre-empting that, a 2006 report on trade performance and 
policies in Eastern Europe and Central Asia included as one of its key recommendations the 
need to reduce the mean and variance of the tariff equivalents of trade barriers, and in 
particular to reduce unilaterally the policy regimes’ anti-export bias, especially in countries 
exporting primary products (Broadman 2006). To progress such reform in Europe’s transition 
economies efficiently and effectively – and to see how recent policies line up with those of 
the European Union (EU) – requires better information on the extent of reform during the 
past two decades and of current policy influences on incentives within and between sectors. 
Immediately prior to their transition to market economies, policies in the region greatly 
distorted producer and consumer incentives, especially for agricultural products. Those 
distortions have been reduced substantially in several countries, but large variations remain 
across the region and distortions appear to be growing again in some countries. Now is thus 
an opportune time to examine how policies affecting agriculture are evolving in this region, 
including as part of the adjustment to EU accession for ten of the transition economies in the 
region. 
                                                 
1 This chapter draws on the introductory and country chapters in Anderson and Swinnen (2008), with data 
updated using Anderson and Valenzuela (2008). Much of the historical data and nominal protection estimates 




Turkey), and seven Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries (Russia, 
Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan). Together 
these countries in 2000-04 accounted for 89 percent of the region’s agricultural value added, 
91 percent of its population and 95 percent of total GDP. Some key characteristics of those 
economies are shown in Table 1, drawn from the detailed compendium of indicators provided 
in the Appendix. Analyses of politically feasible agricultural subsidy and trade policy 
reforms, or of policy options for coping with structural changes such as the current boom in 
energy raw material prices that has intersectoral Dutch-disease effects, need to be based on a 
clear understanding of the recent and current extent of policy interventions and the politico-
economic forces behind their evolution. This study thus also seeks to understand better the 
political economy of distortions to agricultural incentives in ECA countries. With that better 
understanding, the study’s third purpose is to explore prospects for further reducing 
distortions to agricultural incentives and their implications for agricultural competitiveness 
and trade of the different ECA countries, including those that have recently joined the EU.  
The great diversity within the group of ECA countries – in terms of relative resource 
endowments and comparative advantages, stages of development and transition, agricultural 
and trade policy regimes, and memberships of the EU, WTO, OECD and regional trading 
agreements – make the set of countries chosen a rich sample for comparative study. Turkey 
and the central and eastern European countries that are now EU members differ substantially 
from the rest of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) that are now 
members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), having a higher per capita 
income (three-quarters of the global average, compared with one-third for the CIS) and a 
higher population density (half the global land per worker and 70 percent of the global 
agricultural land per capita, compared with 3.4 and 2.5 times, respectively, for the CIS).  
 
 
Growth and Structural Changes During Transition 
 
 
Before examining policy changes, it is helpful to review the economic growth and 
intersectoral changes that have taken place in Europe’s various transition economies over the 
past two decades. The initial years of transition from central planning to a more market-based 




from the mid-1990s. Real GDP for the region as a whole fell by almost 6 percent per year 
during 1990-94. The decline for the central and eastern European (CEE) sample was only 0.6 
percent, while for the CIS sample it was 11 percent and for the residual non-studies countries 
of the CIS 12 percent. By contrast, annual GDP growth in the 1995-2004 period averaged 2.7 
percent: the CIS sample was slowest (2.2 percent), the CEE countries somewhat higher at 3.2 
percent, and the residual enjoyed 5.1 percent. 
Within those economies, agricultural value added measured at constant prices appears 
to have declined less rapidly than non-agricultural GDP in the early years of transition, but 
also to have grown less rapidly in the subsequent decade. The domestic terms of trade (the 
prices of their outputs relative to the prices of purchased inputs) apparently fell even more for 
farmers than for non-farmers, however, because agriculture’s share of GDP measured in 
current prices declined even in the early transition period. Unlike in the central planning 
period, this did not allow faster industrialization but rather an expansion in the services 
sector, which increased from less than half the economy prior to 1993 to two-thirds by 2004. 
The halving of agriculture’s share of GDP in the ECA region between 1992 and 2004 
was accompanied by only a one-quarter decline in agriculture’s share of employment, 
according to FAO statistics (which are not always consistent with national data because of 
definitional differences). In all three sub-groups of countries the latter share by 2004 
averaged three times the former, or five times in the case of the CEE-8 countries that joined 
the EU in 2004. This suggests much lower labor productivity on farms than in other 
employment.  
The share of farm and food products in total merchandise exports also has fallen, by 
as much as half in some ECA countries. When expressed as a ratio of that share for the world 
as a whole (an agricultural revealed comparative advantage index), most countries of the 
region are shown to have lost comparative advantage in farm products over the transition 
period. That index varies greatly across the region though, from a low of less than 0.5 for 
mineral-rich Russia and densely populated Slovenia to more than 3 for Latvia and the Kyrgyz 
Republic. 
The region as a whole has become more open as a consequence of moving from plan 
to market, notwithstanding the continuation of numerous barriers to trade. A common 




countries of the region that percentage is now above the average for Western Europe (37 
percent in 2004), with several countries approaching 60 percent by 2004.
2
  While most of the focus is on agricultural producers, we also consider the extent to 
which consumers are taxed or subsidized. To do so, we calculate a Consumer Tax Equivalent 
(CTE) by comparing the price that consumers pay for their food and the international price of 
each food product at the border. Differences between the NRA and the CTE arise from 
distortions in the domestic economy that are caused by transfer policies and taxes/subsidies 
  
  With this as background, we now turn to review briefly the evolution of policy under 
communism and then to examine how sectoral and trade policies have changed in the ECA 
region in response to, or as contributors to, the above macroeconomic and structural changes.  
 
 
Quantifying the distortions to agricultural incentives  
 
 
The main focus of the present study’s methodology is on government-imposed distortions 
that create a gap between domestic prices and what they would be under free markets. Since 
it is not possible to understand the characteristics of agricultural development with a sectoral 
view alone, the project’s methodology not only estimates the effects of direct agricultural 
policy measures (including distortions in the foreign exchange market), but it also generates 
estimates of distortions in non-agricultural sectors for comparative evaluation. Specifically, 
we compute Nominal Rates of Assistance (NRAs) for farmers including any input subsidies 
and non-product-specific forms of assistance or taxation. It also generates a production-
weighted average NRA for nonagricultural tradables, for comparison with that for 
agricultural tradables via the calculation of a Relative Rate of Assistance (RRA – see 
Anderson et al. 2008). This approach is not well suited to analysis of policies of planned 
economies prior to their reform era, because prices then played only an accounting function 
and currency exchange rates were enormously distorted. During their reform era from 1992, 
however, the price comparison approach provides as valuable a set of indicators for them as 
for other market economies of distortions to incentives for farm production, consumption and 
trade, and of the income transfers associated with interventions.  
                                                 
2 This is a strong feature of Asia’s economies in transition as well. For a comparison of the Asian and European 




that cause the prices paid by consumers (adjusted to the farmgate level) to differ from those 
received by producers.  
To obtain dollar values of farmer assistance and consumer taxation, we have taken the 
estimates of NRA and multiplied them by the gross value of production at undistorted prices 
to obtain an estimate in current US dollars of the direct gross subsidy equivalent of assistance 
to farmers (GSE). These GSE values are calculated in constant dollars, and are also expressed 
on per-farm-worker basis. They (and their equivalent on the consumption side) can be added 
up across products for a country, and across countries for any or all products, to get regional 
aggregate transfer estimates for the studied economies. 
To keep the task manageable, the sample of countries for which empirical estimates 
are provided below is limited to the ten Central and Eastern European countries that joined 




 However, non-quantitative policy assessments were also undertaken for 
the other economies of Central Asia. Reliable price data are available only from 1992 to 2005 
or 2007 or, in the case of Kazakhstan, for just 2000-04.  
The Communist era  
 
Incentives for agricultural producers and food consumers were massively distorted under 
Communist central planning, which was imposed from the 1920s in the former Soviet Union 
(FSU) and from the 1950s in Central and Eastern Europe until the fall of the Berlin Wall in 
1989 and the dismantling of the Soviet Union in 1991. The distortions resulted from a 
combination of collective farm property rights, centrally controlled organization of 
production allocation, processing, input provision and marketing, as well as the setting of 
prices unrelated to demand-supply conditions (leading to rationing), and state controlled 
trading and exchange rate systems. Land and farms were put under central planning and in 
most countries (with the exception of Poland and former Yugoslavia) farming was forcefully 
organized in collective and state farms. This collectivization process and the associated 
forced migration (and worse) of many landowners and farmers contributed to massive hunger 
and death before the Second World War in the Soviet Union. From Lenin to Stalin and 
                                                 
3 The only country from this region that was part of the Krueger, Schiff and Valdés (1991) study was Turkey, 
for the period 1961 to 1983. However, a follow-up study subsequently undertaken for a few economies in 




through most of Khrushchev’s regime, agriculture was heavily taxed, and capital was drained 
from an impoverished countryside to finance urban industrial growth (Ellman 1988).
4
  By 1990, per capita consumption of livestock products and foodstuffs in general 
compared favorably with many OECD countries, even though per capita incomes in Central 
and East Europe were much lower than the OECD average. This “achievement” came at a 
cost: large state subsidies, to both producers and consumers, were necessary to maintain the 
high levels of production and consumption. For example, by the end of the 1980s, direct 
budgetary subsidies to the agriculture and food economy were about 10 percent of GDP in 
the USSR and between 5 and 10 percent of GDP in most CEE countries. The bulk of these 
subsidies went to the livestock sector.
   
This all changed at the end of the Khruschev regime and especially under Brezhnev. 
The leadership of the USSR decided to increase agricultural production, with a strong 
emphasis on livestock, and this was a policy also followed by many of the Eastern European 
countries of the Soviet Bloc (Liefert and Swinnen 2002). From the mid-1950s onwards, and 
especially in the 1970s and 1980s, large amounts of support and investment were directed to 
agriculture. By 1980, almost 30 percent of total Soviet investment was going into agriculture 
(Gray 1990).  At the same time, consumer prices were set low and producer prices high, with 
the gap covered by direct subsidies to processing and trading companies or by soft budget 
constraints. Consequently, from 1970 to 1990 livestock herds and output in these countries 
grew by between 40 and 60 percent. The rise in feed requirements for the growing herds 
stimulated the crop sector. In the late 1980s, the average annual output of feed grain in 
Poland and Hungary was up by half and one-quarter, respectively, compared with output in 
the late 1960s. In the USSR the feed requirements were so great that the country also became 
a substantial importer of feed commodities. 
5
Calculating the net transfers to farmers and to consumers under the Communist 
regime is very difficult because of the large number of distortions caused by the state 
regulations of prices, production and consumption, exchange rates, marketing organizations, 
the indirect nature of some of the subsidies, and so forth. While it is generally true that 
producers of farm products were strongly subsidized by price settings towards the end of the 
Communist regime (in sharp contrast to the 1930s when farmers were highly discriminated 
against), the complexity of the distortions led sometimes to offsetting effects. For example, 
  
                                                 
4 The dramatic implications – including millions of peasants dying of starvation – are documented in sobering 
detail in Conquest (1986). 




while agricultural producers in the latter 1980s were supported through high output prices 
and low input prices, at the same time overvalued exchange rates effectively taxed 
agricultural (and other) exporters. Correcting for this overvaluation leads to significantly 
lower protection indicators. As well, agriculture was not alone in being subsidized, as most 
(heavy) industry was also subsidized or at least protected from import competition. The 
available fragments of empirical evidence indicate that, on aggregate and in real terms, there 
was substantial net subsidization of agriculture relative to all other sectors as a group, 
although much more so for livestock producers than for grain and oilseed farmers. This might 
suggest food consumers were taxed substantially, but under the central planning system 
wholesalers were told to sell their food to retailers below their production costs, for which 
they received state subsidies. As well, with overvalued exchange rates effectively taxing 
exports and subsidizing imports, they too lowered domestic consumer prices of tradable 
products. However, by restricting foreign imports and regulating trade, the Communist 
regime prevented its consumers from accessing higher-quality food products. Kostova, 
Huffman and Johnson (2004) estimate that these welfare losses were equivalent to 50 percent 
to 75 percent of the direct subsidy benefits of consumers under the communist regime.  
 
The reform era 
 
After 1989, the CEE-8 countries moved first and most rapidly towards market-based systems. 
The reforms in the Balkan countries, such as Romania and Bulgaria, were initially half-
hearted and involved many inconsistencies during most of the 1990s, with government 
interventions continuing to heavily distort incentives. In the large CIS countries (Russia, 
Kazakhstan and Ukraine), governments continued important controls of the agricultural 
economy through a variety of interventions such as regional trade controls, input supply 
controls, and the continuation of soft budget constraints. While the Kyrgyz Republic 
liberalized relatively quickly, the other Central Asian countries moved slower and some have 
undertaken far less reform and liberalization. In particular, major controls still remain in 
place in such countries as Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. 
International trade had been strongly regulated under the centrally planned system. 
The Communist countries were integrated in the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance 
(CMEA) system, which was a planned inter-country trading regime, trading mainly with 
other communist countries. (One could think of the CMEA as the international version of the 




but still a large part of their trade volume went through the CMEA system. When the CMEA 
system collapsed in the early 1990s with the liberalization of the macro-economy and of trade 
policies, important changes in trade and financial flows resulted. Trade liberalization 
reinforced the reallocation of production activities caused by the abolishment of central 
planning. Traditional international production allocations were no longer possible when trade 
had to be financed by hard currencies and when inputs were accounted for at real costs. It 
also allowed the importation of high-quality Western produce which had earlier been 
restricted. At the same time, the liberalization of the exchange rates removed discrimination 
against the sectors producing tradables.  
Trade liberalization led to a major international reorganization of production 
activities. Initially this had a very negative impact on the region’s producers, as the traditional 
export markets dwindled due to a lack of hard currency and because Western countries 
remained closed to the region’s agricultural exports. At the same time the reduction of import 
constraints opened regional markets to imports from the West. In combination, this caused a 
worsening of the region’s agricultural trade balance in the first half of the 1990s. Later on, 
however, agri-food trade intensified and growing exports (also to Western markets) 
contributed to the region’s recovery. An important development was the shift from centrally 
imposed extreme specialization (e.g., dairy production in the Baltics and cotton production in 
Central Asia) to more-diversified production systems and less dependence on single 
commodities in those countries.  
Trade effects were only part of the international effects in the agri-food systems.  
Possibly even more important was the massive inflow of foreign direct investment to food 
processing industries, which contributed to a major restructuring and to improvements in 
food quality and productivity enhancements and investments in agriculture (Dries and 
Swinnen 2004). Most recently, the wave of foreign investments in the retail sector caused 
further restructurings of the agri-food system, with important implications for both producers 
and consumers (Dries, Reardon and Swinnen 2004).  
The progress in market reforms is not always correlated with the extent of distortions. 
On the one hand Slovenia, which was a front runner in liberalization and developing a market 
economy, has a very high level of farm producer support that in 2004 was well above the 
average EU15 rate. On the other hand, much-slower reformers such as Bulgaria, Ukraine and 
Kazakhstan have much lower – even negative – NRAs. Turkey, which has not been under 
Communist rule but nonetheless had a highly state-controlled food system (including price 




higher level of support within ECA during 2004-05 despite the fact that there was a major 
policy reform after 2000, including a shift in assistance from market price support towards 
direct payments.  
 
Nominal rates of assistance to agriculture during transition 
 
When domestic markets, trade and currency exchange regimes were liberalized in the early 
1990s, farm output declined dramatically, as a result of nominal input prices increasing much 
more strongly than output prices. Industrial output also declined, and by a similar order of 
magnitude, while the services sector – which had been severely constrained under the 
Communist system (at least as a stand-alone set of activities as distinct from being part of 
state-owned farm and industrial enterprises) – grew rapidly after transition began. 
Beginning in the early 1990s, many trade and price distortions were removed 
throughout the region. Price, exchange rate and trade policies were all liberalized, subsidies 
were cut, hard budget constraints were introduced, property rights were privatized, and 
production decisions were shifted to companies and households. One consequence was that, 
on average, support to agriculture fell to very low levels in the early 1990s (as it did also for 
industrial production). Between 1992 and 1995, nominal assistance to agriculture averaged 
just 12 percent in the CEEC-10 and was below zero in Bulgaria and the three Baltic nations – 
as it was in Russia and Ukraine. By contrast, in Turkey, where nominal assistance averaged 
just 5 percent during 1986-89, its NRA rose to an average of 15 percent during 1992-95 and 
25 percent in 1996-99 (Figure 1 and Table 2).  
The changes in policies and hence in rates of agricultural assistance have not been 
smooth, but rather characterized by stop-go phases and sometimes even reversals of previous 
reforms, as is apparent from Figure 1. Despite that heterogeneity of experiences, one can 
identify a couple of general phases in the policy changes. 
Following its initial collapse, support to agriculture increased during the mid-1990s in 
some of the region’s countries. In the CEE this was driven by the explicit introduction of new 
support policies, while in Russia it reflected primarily exchange rate developments which, in 
the presence of institutional constraints which constrained the pass-through of border prices 
to farm-gate prices, pushed assistance rates up to high levels.  
The increase in support started first in Central Europe where, after the radical 
liberalization in the early 1990s, political pressures induced governments to re-introduce a 




around 20 to 30+ percent in the second half of the 1990s, but then they stabilized in the lead-
up to EU accession in 2004. Between 2000 and 2003, the average rate of assistance to 
agriculture in the CEEC-10 was just under 25 percent (Figure 1), which is slightly less than 
half the rate of assistance (including from programs somewhat decoupled from production) 
provided to farmers in the EU-15 at that time (see Josling 2008).   
Further East, two economic changes in the late 1990s had major impacts on 
agricultural incentives. First, the Russian crisis and the associated devaluation of the Ruble 
(and some other currencies in the region) in the presence of imperfect pass-through, caused a 
strong decline in the estimated rates of assistance to agriculture. This macro-economic 
correction brought estimated assistance rates down to much lower. Second, the hike in world 
energy and mineral prices, and general economic growth in the 2000s, improved many CIS 
governments’ budgetary situations. The latter induced an increase in budgetary support to 
agriculture. For example, in Russia the government announced that agriculture would be one 
of the priority areas for more funding in 2005. Not all the additional funding is to go to 
subsidies, as some governments have plans to spend considerably on infrastructure and 
quality upgrading in agriculture. Also, rural incomes have improved because of better (and 
timely) payments of farm workers’ wages and pensions to farm and rural workers, and 
because of improved rural services.   
The combination of all these developments led to a somewhat lower weighted average 
NRA for agriculture in the region as a whole for the four-year period since 2000 than in the 
period immediately before: 16 percent during 2000-03 compared with 22 percent in 1996-99 
(Table 2). In Russia the average support level fell even more (from 25 to 13 per cent). 
However, during 2004 and 2005 supports rose again, including in those countries that have 
since joined the EU (before they dropped again as international food prices rose in 2007). 
Meanwhile, the NRA moved closer to zero in Ukraine in 2005, but is probably still very 
negative in the rest of Central Asia. There is thus a very wide dispersion in average NRAs 
across countries in the region, from very high levels in the highest-income country (Slovenia) 
to negative leves still in the poorest countries of Bulgaria, Kazakhstan and Ukraine (Figure 
2).  
There are major differences in distortions across commodities too. In the 1980s 
virtually all commodities were supported, albeit some more than others. With transition the 
variation has remained, but in the CIS some commodities are now taxed (Table 3). For 
example, by 2000-03, sugar, poultry and milk were the most highly protected commodities in 




Ukraine the range is even more extreme, from high positive assistance to livestock and sugar 
to high negative assistance to the production of the key feed inputs into livestock (coarse 
grains and oilseeds). It happens that sunflower seed is Russia’s dominantly produced and 
traded oilseed and the only consistently exported commodity through the transition period. 
The case of Kazakhstan in 2004 was even starker, where import-competing producers were 
highly assisted while exporting industries had to endure negative assistance such that, even 
though the average NRA was close to zero, a strong anti-agricultural trade bias prevailed.   
Government intervention and controls are especially important in a few key 
commodities within each country, often because of (real or imagined) food security concerns 
or the need to raise government revenue to meet other priorities. This is, for example, the 
case for grains and oilseeds in Ukraine, Bulgaria and Russia, both for human consumption 
and to support (via low feed input prices) the production of livestock products. It has been 
true also for cotton in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, where heavy taxation is 
distorting incentives for producers – although open or porous borders make the taxing of 
cotton exports difficult while tax rates vary across countries in that sub-region. 
The trade bias index reported in Table 4 is one way of capturing the diversity of 
assistance rates across farm commodities. The more negative is that index, the greater the gap 
between assistance to import-competing farm industries and assistance (or in some cases 
effective taxation) of export industries. Table 4 suggests that the anti-trade bias has been a 
persistent feature of agricultural policies in the region throughout the transition period – 
indeed it has been worse in recent years than it was a decade earlier.  
An even more comprehensive way to measure the extent of variance of rates across 
time is to calculate the standard deviation of NRAs for the covered products. These too have 
remained persistently high and on average have been higher in recent years than in the early 
stages of transition (Table 5). 
The total amount of support is an imperfect indicator of distortions to incentives, since 
different trade, price and subsidy instruments have different distortion effects. Most support 
to agriculture in the region was and, despite the reforms, still is provided via highly distortive 
and hence inefficient policy instruments. Under the Communist regime, output price 
distortions were complemented with heavy distortions in input prices, in particular low 
fertilizer and energy prices and subsidized irrigation, while in the 1990s the majority of farm 
support in the CEE countries was provided by output prices being kept above border prices 
(see near bottom of Table 3). However, the share of support from those measures has 




changes are reflected in the composition of the assistance that farms have received. Under the 
Communist system, price support and output subsidies were the main component in the 
CEECs, accounting for more than 80 percent of their NRA. After the reforms in the early 
1990s, the share of market support and output subsidies declined substantially, falling below 
half. Since then it has grown again to around half of the NRA. The other important 
components of the NRAs of CEE countries and Turkey were input subsidies, direct payments 
and other non-product-specific subsidies, plus some decoupled payments in the most-recent 
years (Table 6).
6
Since most of the support for farmers came through price-support measures, most 
notably import restrictions, these have the effect of raising consumer prices by a similar 
degree when calculated at the farmgate. That means that prior to the mid-1990s, policies in 
all but Turkey and Slovenia imposed the equivalent of low or negative taxes on food 
consumers (CTEs), but thereafter the CTEs have become positive. The region’s weighted 
average CTE in 2000-03 was 17 percent (Table 8), compared with nearly twice that in the 
 In the CIS countries, those payments include soft loans and debt forgiveness 
which continue to play an important role. While fiscal constraints for most of the 1990s 
limited the government’s ability to support farms by this means, the budgetary situation has 
changed in the 2000s as earnings from mineral and energy exports grew and this has become 
a more important source of government assistance to farmers. 
The gross subsidy equivalent of the assistance to farmers, when expressed in constant 
(2000) dollar terms, shows Turkey to have been the largest supporter throughout the past 15 
years. But Russia is rapidly catching Turkey, and Romania and Poland are the next biggest 
aggregate supporters. For the region as a whole, the supports are the equivalent of more than 
$24 billion per year, compared with just $3 billion in the early years of transition (Table 
7(a)). When expressed on a per farmer basis, the range is huge. In 2000-03, for example, it 
ranged from negative amounts (-$300) in Ukraine and Kazakhstan to an average of $980 in 
the CEECs, $430 in Russia, more than $2200 in Hungary and Romania, and a huge $22,100 
per farmer in high-income Slovenia (Table 7(b)). This compares with $8400 per farmer in the 
EU-15 in 2000-04 (Josling 2008). Slovenia’s support has already come down significantly 
since its accession to the EU (average of just under $14.000 per farmer in 2005-07).. For the 
EU accedents per farmer assistance over the next few years is likely to move closer to the EU 
average.  
                                                 
6 Water price regulations and subsidies are important policy instruments in the irrigated regions of Central Asia, 
but it was not possible in this study to estimate their impact on NRAs. Energy policies are still used to assist 
various sectors, for example in Russia, but since they do not favor agriculture in particular, and are becoming 




EU-15. The high CTEs in Romania and Slovenia have been well above that EU average this 
decade and so presumably will fall during those countries’ transition to the EU’s Common 
Agricultural Policy, especially given the EU’s policy re-instrumentation towards more direct 
farm income supports that do not raise consumer prices of food. 
 
Assistance to agriculture relative to other tradable sectors   
 
The region’s import tariffs on primary agricultural commodities are on average twice as high 
as average tariffs in industry, but only half as high as tariffs on processed food. This is true 
both for the CEECs and for CIS countries. It suggests that while the region’s farmers receive 
more tariff protection from competition abroad than do non-agricultural producers, food 
processors may be effectively protected despite having to pay above world prices for primary 
farm products.  
The import-competing producers are only part of each sector, however. When account 
also is taken of support for producers of exports in each sector, an overall NRA for all non-
agricultural tradable industries can be used, together with the average NRA for agricultural 
tradable industries, to calculate the relative rate of assistance (RRA). In so far as the NRAs 
for non-farm industries are positive, the RRA is lower than the NRA for agriculture. But in 
most cases the nonagricultural NRA is very low. Thus the overall NRA for tradable primary 
agriculture in the region during 2000-03 is estimated to have averaged more than three times 
higher than for producers of non-agricultural tradables (15 as compared with 5 percent), so 
the RRA averaged 10 percent. Only in three countries – Bulgaria, Kazakhstan and Ukraine – 
has agricultural production assisted less than nonagricultural tradables (RRA<0) during the 
present decade. And in virtually all countries for which there is a time series, the RRA is 
higher at the end of our sample period than in the first few years of transition (Figure 3).  
 
 
Forces Behind Transitional Policy Choices 
 
 
Several political economy stylized facts that are widely observed in market economies – for 
reasons explained in, for example, Anderson and Hayami (1986), Anderson (1995), Swinnen 




Specifically, for this region as elsewhere, farmer assistance tends to be higher in higher-
income countries, and in countries with weaker comparative advantage in agriculture. Hence 
it is likely that similar political-economic interactions and mechanisms are at work in this 
region as in other parts of the world. However, those correlations are becoming weaker over 
time among the CEECs. Taking on the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy is part of the 
explanation, but there are also other forces, both domestic and international, that underlay the 
political economy of agricultural policies in the CEE and CIS countries. Several key ones are 
discussed in the following sub-sections. 
 
Causes of rent extraction 
 
Traditionally, heavy negative government intervention in the form of depressed incentives 
tends to be concentrated on commodities that have the potential to provide export tax revenue 
for the government. This is especially the case in the cotton sectors of Uzbekistan, 
Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. There, as in a number of African countries (see Anderson and 
Masters 2009), the government controls the cotton chain so as to extract rents, thereby 
depressing farmers’ prices and production incentives. There is a clear division in Central Asia 
between the roughly neutral policy towards cotton in Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic 
(where cotton exports used to be a relatively modest share of exports) on the one hand, and 
on the other the extensive taxation and extraction of rents from cotton in Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan (countries where cotton traditionally was a very important export 
tax resource).
7
                                                 
7 Price and trade data were not sufficiently reliable to allow NRA calculations, but Pomfret (2007a,b) and 
Christensen and Pomfret (2007) provide considerable informal information supporting the claims above. 
 In Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan governments use state monopoly powers 
over marketing to transfer substantial resources out of agriculture. Most of the transfers in 
Uzbekistan appear to go to general government revenue, whereas in Turkmenistan much is 
wasted (e.g., in inefficient cotton mills with negative value added) or accrues to secret 
accounts under the President’s personal control. Moreover, recently some potentially 
important reforms have been introduced in Uzbekistan to reduce some of the distortions to 
farm incentives, while almost none have taken place in Turkmenistan. In Tajikistan the rent 
distribution is more opaque, but equally detrimental to farms, as a coalition between the 
government and a monopolistic private trading company has caused depressed prices and 




incentive distortions, both in area and output: with rapid growth in Kazakhstan and the 
Kyrgyz Republic, and with declines or stagnation in the other countries. 
The grain (and oilseed) export sectors of Ukraine, Bulgaria, and the grain-surplus 
regions of Russia are similarly characterized by heavy government regulation and 
interventions. In traditional grain-exporting countries such as Ukraine and Bulgaria, the grain 
sector has disproportionate political significance – for historic and psychological reasons. For 
example, in the mid-1990s in Bulgaria, ministers of agriculture had to resign regularly 
following reports of grain shortfalls or unregulated exports threatening the local grain supply. 
In Ukraine, ad hoc grain market interventions continued in recent years.  
Opportunities for rent seeking from distorted policies inhibit policy reform, as the few 
who benefit disproportionately from the existing distortions lobby strongly for their 
continuation. This applies to various policies, such as cotton regulations in Central Asia, 
grain trade regulations in Bulgaria, Ukraine, and Russia, and water policies in Central Asia. 
But it also applies to several policies in countries in which benefits go a specific group of 
farms. For example, the continuation of soft budget constraints in the large CIS countries, and 
the failure of governments to enforce bankruptcies and enforce strong land rights all 
disproportionately benefit large farming companies, while smaller family farms are often hurt 
by these policies. In Turkey, agricultural para-statal companies and marketing cooperatives 
benefit from “farm support” and are major lobbyists in favor of market regulations and 
assistance packages.  
Sometimes specific political, regional, or ethnic coalitions play a role. For example, in 
Kazakhstan many residents of the rich northern grain regions were Russian and German. 
After independence, power shifted to Kazakh nationals, limiting the Russian and German 
groups’ influence in government and causing many to emigrate. Another recent example is 
Bulgaria, where the resistance of the government to privatize the tobacco processing 
companies and its decision to allocate a disproportionate amount of subsidies to tobacco 
growers is due to the fact that the Turkish minority in Bulgaria is strongly active in the 
tobacco sector, and held key positions in the Ministry of Agriculture.  
 
Causes of increases in support during transition 
 
The increases in agricultural support in the CEECs in the second half of the 1990s and more 
recently in the CIS are the result of the interaction of domestic political forces with 




the ‘normal’ domestic internal pressures that are brought to bear in a contestable political 
environment which result in rises in agricultural protectionism as per capita income increases 
and as agricultural comparative advantage declines. In this period it was a case of reversing 
somewhat the overshooting in reform during the first few years of transition.  
Overlaying that is the EU accession process, which encouraged CEE governments to 
target the levels of support expected in the EU by the end of the phase-in period of accession, 
so as to maximize the transfer of benefits from Brussels. However, it appears that in the years 
before accession the EU accession process had more impact on the introduction of new 
support instruments than on the overall level of support, probably because all the cost of that 
support had to be borne within the national economy prior to EU accession (Swinnen 2002).  
Another contributing factor was the improvements in the government’s budgetary 
situation, which allowed more subsidies to be given to farmers than was possible in the early 
years of transition. This factor has played a role throughout the ECA region, but in particular 
in Russia and some of its neighbors where recovery from the post-1998 fiscal crisis has been 
aided by windfall gains from the dramatic rise in the prices of their exports of energy raw 
materials. This factor was stronger in those countries where governments have more access to 
mineral resources, such as in Russia (oil and gas), Kazakhstan (oil), Turkmenistan (gas).   
 
Crises and political change 
 
General political and economic crises have played an important role in inducing changes in 
agricultural distortions. The most obvious example is the fall of the Communist regime and 
the disintegration of the Soviet Union – and of the central directives coming from Moscow. 
However, even later there are several examples where more general crises have triggered 
changes. Most often the policy reforms came only after new elections induced a change in 
government, reflecting changed electoral preferences. 
For example, in Romania and Bulgaria, important progress in the removal of 
distortions and market reforms only occurred in the late 1990s after electoral change brought 
reform-minded governments to power. In Bulgaria that was caused by the financial crises in 
1996. Important reform progress was made in Ukraine in the years after the 1999 election in 
which the large farm lobby fell out with President Kuchma, who consequently introduced a 
series of important reforms which the farms had successfully opposed previously.    
However, democratic political change is not a sufficient condition in itself for better 




changes (the “Orange Revolution” and the “Tulip Revolution”, respectively) have not 
contributed to better agricultural policy. In fact the Ukraine government seems to have 
reversed, while in the Kyrgyz Republic change has mostly resulted in more instability, while 
relatively little distortions remain in agriculture. 
   
Impact of international agreements  
 
EU accession, both prospective and then actual, has had obvious and profound influences on 
policy choices. The CEE countries that joined in May 2004 and January 2007 have raised 
domestic agricultural and food prices up towards EU-15 levels (on average, since for some 
prices came down). An important part of the EU farm subsidies are now under the form of 
direct payments. CEE farms receive considerably less of these subsidies than those received 
by EU-15 farmers, but they will gradually increase to reach EU-15 levels by 2010. Another 
important difference is that these subsidies in the EU-15 will be given on a per farm basis 
(single farm payments) earlier than will be the case for the CEECs.   
The CEE countries have been induced also to undertake major regulatory 
improvements to stimulate their markets, including private investments in the food chain and 
public rural infrastructure investments. Their trade policies have likewise changed so as to 
allow free access for all products from other EU-27 member countries and, in most cases, 
also freer access for non-agricultural products from non-EU countries (the latter because the 
common external tariff typically was lower than that previously applying in acceding 
countries). 
The EU accession process has not caused a major increase in food prices in the CEE 
countries. One reason is the increased competition on consumer markets in the CEECs with 
the full opening of agri-food markets to imports, and with the massive inflow of foreign 
direct investment in the retail sector.  
The impacts of other international agreements (including WTO accessions) have 
varied. The Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Turkey have 
been members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) since its creation in 1995. Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Kyrgyz, Armenia, Georgia, Albania and Ukraine joined the WTO 
later, while Russia and Kazakhstan are still negoting their WTO accession. 
WTO accession has not strongly disciplined ECA countries that were founding 
members in 1995 (Bacchetta and Drabek 2002). For those that had to negotiate their entry in 




And for those large ECA countries still in the process of negotiating their accession, notably 
Russia and Kazakhstan, the WTO membership has been even tougher in their demands. 
Whether that latter stance will prove an agricultural trade-liberalizing force remains to be 
seen, but at least it will provide a ceiling on the extent to which agricultural protection and 
subsidies may be raised in the future. 
For the CEECs, the most important WTO impact has been indirect: in anticipation of 
eastward enlargement, the EU was forced to introduce major changes to its Common 
Agricultural Policy, which in turn has affected post-accession agricultural distortions in the 
CEECs. 
A further and somewhat erratic influence has been the regional trading arrangements 
among the ECA countries. These include the Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC), the 
Central European Free Trade Area (CEFTA), and the Baltic Free Trade Area (BFTA). 
However, the impact of these agreements on reducing agricultural policy distortions has 
generally been limited since the agreements include many exceptions for agricultural and 
food products, and especially for so-called “sensitive products” which make up a substantial 
share of production. Moreover, Central Asian countries such as Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz 
Republic have been reluctant to join the EAEC, because it would impose Russia’s trade and 
customs preferences on them.  
 
Influence of international institutions  
 
The role of other international institutions was very important at the start of transition, as it 
provided policy reform guidance in all these countries. However, in more recent years this 
advice has been less effective. For those joining the EU, policy advice from Brussels was 
perceived as more relevant. This is especially, but not only, the case for the EU accession 
countries. Also for those countries aspiring to join the EU (such as most of the Balkan 
countries and Ukraine), or those seeing the accession countries as models for their own 
development strategies, policy advice from Brussels is taken seriously. Another reason is that 
in many of the countries of southeast Europe and the CIS, their improved fiscal and 
macroeconomic situations have made them less beholden to those international financial 






Prospects for reducing distortions further  
 
 
Clearly there have been major reductions in distortions to agricultural incentives in the region 
over the past two decades, and in many of the countries average protection levels are now 
relatively low. However, there is still substantial room for further reduction of distortions to 
agricultural incentives. This could be done through various means: overall reductions in 
support, shifting support to less-distortive policy instruments, and focusing budgetary 
expenditures on public good investments (in infrastructure and institutions to reduce trade 
costs) rather than on farm subsidies, shifting from a quantity-based to a quality-based policy 
paradigm, and so forth.  
In terms of further reductions in policy distortions, some of the most distortive cases 
concern taxation of agriculture, most notably the control and rent extraction in the cotton 
sectors in some Central Asian countries. Removing those distortions would allow a 
substantial improvement in incentives to domestic producers. Some progress has been made 
in recent years, but much more can be done.   
Those countries for which EU accession is unlikely to happen even in the medium 
future (such as for Turkey, Ukraine and several of the Balkan countries) should focus their 
policy attention in the near term on efficiency improvements in both their policies and their 
agricultural economies. This is consistent with the objective of EU accession, since the EU 
itself has moved in recent years to more decoupled farm support and is demanding that 
member countries move in that direction and improve the efficiency of their farms and food 
companies.
8
                                                 
8 From this perspective, it is important to point to the importance of other reforms, such as macroeconomic and 
regulatory reforms to stimulate food industry investment, labor market reforms to enhance off-farm employment 
opportunities, and credit reforms to stimulate access to rural credit. 
 
The same policy framework should be promoted in countries further east, which 
include those that are likely to spend more funds on agriculture in the coming years as their 
fiscal situation further improves. Increased funding should be focused on upgrading 
infrastructure, on quality and efficiency of the agri-food system, and on the introduction or 
improvements of a variety of institutions necessary to support rural markets. In several of the 
poorer and the larger CIS countries, institutional and infrastructure problems, as well as 




Competition and anti-trust policy is an important related area for policy attention. In 
supply chains where farms have to sell their products to trading, processing, and retailing 
companies, the ability to choose freely between companies is of crucial importance in getting 
better conditions for farms. This applies across the region where monopoly buyers (state-
owned or private) push down prices and contract conditions, although the source of anti-
competitive behavior and policy details are likely to differ, e.g. between the increasing 
dominance of large retail chains in Central Europe versus some of the government controlled 
cotton chains in Central Asia.  
Despite constraining political economy forces, there are prospects for further reducing 
distortions to agricultural incentives in the foreseeable future. The accession of the CEE 
countries to the EU has increased their levels of farm assistance, although they now face 
more competition within the enlarged EU. While reducing CEE farm assistance in the future 
will not happen without reductions in EU protection levels, some reforms are currently 
underway in the EU (e.g., the cut in EU sugar price support and the shift from per hectare 
payments to single farm payments). However, the slow and intermittent progress in the 
WTO’s Doha trade negotiations reduces the pressure for further reforms. Meanwhile, in the 
mineral- and energy-rich CIS countries, the rise in export earnings reduces budgetary 
constraints on governments inclined to give assistance to farmers as national incomes grow. 
And CIS regional trade policies that affect markets are largely ad hoc and nontransparent, and 
are important distortions. However, eliminating these policy interventions would require 
fundamental reforms of Russia’s political system, including a transformation of attitudes and 
behaviors involving governance that Russian accession to the WTO is unlikely to alter in the 
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Figure 2: Nominal rates of assistance to agriculture, individual Eastern European focus 





















































































































Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), updated from estimates reported in Anderson and 




Figure 3: Relative rates of assistance to agriculture,
a Eastern European focus countries, 1992-













































Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), updated from estimates reported in Anderson and 
Swinnen (2008). 





t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors, respectively. No estimates are available for including after Kazakhstan, 




Table 1: Key economic and trade indicators, Eastern European and CIS countries,
e 2000-04  
 





















     
Slovenia  0.03  0.07  0.04  216  32  52  -0.68  0  na 
Czech Rep.  0.16  0.22  0.19  135  52  61  -0.44  0  26 
Hungary  0.16  0.20  0.14  122  72  90  0.40  0  27 
Estonia  0.02  0.02  0.03  102  78  199  -0.38  1  36 
Poland  0.62  0.57  0.47  93  57  105  -0.39  0  34 
Slovak Rep.  0.09  0.07  0.09  92  57  57  -0.50  0  na 
Lithuania  0.06  0.04  0.08  80  125  176  -0.21  1  36 
Latvia  0.04  0.03  0.03  76  132  364  -0.51  0  38 
Turkey  1.12  0.62  1.97  55  70  131  0.09  3  44 
Romania  0.35  0.15  0.49  41  84  74  -0.06  1  31 
Bulgaria  0.13  0.05  0.15  39  86  143  0.37  0  29 
CEE sample  2.75  2.05  3.67  74  70  98  -0.09  1  37 
Russia  2.34  1.10  1.58  47  186  53  -0.46  0  40 
Kazakhstan  0.24  0.08  0.18  33  1737  76  na  1  34 
Ukraine  0.78  0.13  0.46  17  107  112  na  0  28 
Turkmenistan  0.07  0.01  0.06  18  881  92  na  5  41 
Uzbekistan  0.41  0.03  0.27  8  134  na  na  0  37 
Kyrgyz Rep.  0.08  0.00  0.05  6  268  390  na  0  30 
Tajikistan  0.10  0.00  0.03  4  85  192  na  7  33 
CIS sample  4.02  1.37  2.62  34  270  na  0.02  0  37 
Other CEE/CA  0.64  0.19  0.61  29  82  166  0.41  1  na 
All CEE/CA  7.43  3.60  6.90  48  179  na  -0.06  0  37 
Source: Sandri, Valenzuela and Anderson (2008), compiled from World Bank (2007). 
a. Revealed Comparative Advantage = share of agriculture and processed food in national 
exports as a ratio of that sector’s share of global exports 
b. Primary Agric Trade Specialization Index = (X-M)/(X+M), 2000-02 (world av =0). 
c. Percentage of population living on <US$1/day, from Chen and Ravallion (2007).  
d. Gini Indices for the most recent year during 2000-04 , from Chen and Ravallion (2007). 




Table 2: Nominal rates of assistance to agriculture,
a Eastern European and CIS focus 
countries, 1992 to 2007 
(percent) 
 
  1992-95  1996-99  2000-03  2004-07
d 
         
Bulgaria  -19  -11  0  7 
Czech Rep  20  19  27  24 
Estonia  -14  20  20  23 
Hungary  19  18  34  20 
Latvia  -15  30  36  28 
Lithuania  -19  29  32  29 
Poland  10  24  7  32 
Romania  22  29  53  50 
Slovakia  28  26  30  21 
Slovenia  64  79  80  31 
CEEC-10  12  22  24  31 
         
Turkey  15  25  22  30 
Russia  -8  25  13  19 
Ukraine  -21  -1  -11  -2 
Kazakhstan  na  na  0  -5 
         
All focus countries:       
Unweighted average
b  6  24  25  22 
Wted average
a  3  22  16  25 
Dispersion
c  26  21  26  14 
Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) updated from estimates reported in Anderson and 
Swinnen (2008). 
a. Weighted average for each country, including product-specific output and input distortions 
and non-product-specific assistance as well as authors’ guesstimates for non-covered farm 
products, with weights based on gross value of agricultural production at undistorted prices.  
b. The unweighted average is the simple average across the 14 countries of their national 
NRA (production-weighted) average NRAs.  
c. Dispersion is a simple 4-year average of the annual standard deviation around a weighted 
mean of the national agricultural sector NRAs.    
d. Final column refers just to 2004-05 for Russia and Ukraine and 2004 for Kazakhstan; and 
the CEEC values assume the NRA for each product is the same as for the EU-25 in 2004-06 
and for EU-27 in 2007, such that the differences across CEE countries is due to differing 




Table 3: Nominal rates of assistance, key covered farm products,
a Eastern European and CIS 





  1992-95  1996-99  2000-03  2004-07 
Wheat  -6  13  2  9 
Barley  1  16  -5  6 
Oats  -11  7  -27  -4 
Rye  0  14  -10  -2 
Maize  16  3  16  21 
Rapeseed  -8  -18  1  0 
Sunflower  -13  -13  -13  4 
Soybean  45  0  9  -4 
Cotton  -45  -47  -31  -29 
Sugar  23  80  73  91 
Potato  25  25  60  57 
Beef  -16  20  36  53 
Sheepmeat  10  10  3  15 
Pigmeat  -8  16  12  32 
Poultry  26  43  52  75 
Egg  16  48  2  25 
Milk  6  43  25  26 
All covered products  -2  19  13  22 
Domestic market support  1  1  1  2 
Border market support  -4  15  11  19 
Dispersion of product NRAs  21  29  29  31 
Product coverage
b  62  63  61  62 
 
Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) updated from estimates reported in Anderson and 
Swinnen (2008). 
a Region’s weighted average for each product and for All covered products, with weights 
based on gross value of agricultural production at undistorted prices.  
b Dispersion is the standard deviation shown is the simple 4-year average of the annual 




Table 4: Trade bias index,




  1992-95  1996-99  2000-03  2004-07
b 
         
Bulgaria  -0.02  -0.17  -0.18  -0.30 
Czech Rep  0.05  -0.10  -0.23  -0.16 
Estonia  -0.21  -0.16  -0.01  0.24 
Hungary  -0.14  0.12  -0.11  0.05 
Latvia  -0.35  -0.18  0.15  -0.22 
Lithuania  -0.50  -0.32  -0.19  0.07 
Poland  -0.19  -0.19  -0.24  0.26 
Romania  -0.19  -0.28  -0.40  -0.23 
Slovakia  0.03  -0.09  -0.05  0.06 
Slovenia  0.26  0.40  0.38  0.18 
CEEC-10  -0.15  -0.16  -0.23  0.02 
         
Turkey  -0.32  -0.46  -0.32  -0.19 
Russia  -0.11  -0.31  -0.34  -0.24 
Ukraine  -0.12  -0.25  -0.21  -0.42 
Kazakhstan  na  na  0.01  -0.32 
         
All focus countries  -0.15  -0.16  -0.23  0.02 
 
Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) updated from estimates reported in Anderson and 
Swinnen (2008). 
aThe trade bias index, TBI, defined as: 
TBI = [(1+NRAagx/100)/(1+NRAagm/100) – 1] 
where NRAagm and NRAagx are the average percentage NRAs for the import-competing and 
exportable parts of the agricultural sector.  




Table 5: Dispersion of nominal rates of assistance across covered agricultural products,
a 
Eastern European and CIS focus countries, 1992 to 2007 
(percent) 
 
  1992-95  1996-99  2000-03  2004-07
c 
         
Bulgaria  18  21  25  48 
Czech Rep  27  28  23  53 
Estonia  24  28  20  45 
Hungary  34  41  62  49 
Latvia  42  40  44  58 
Lithuania  47  47  53  54 
Poland  31  28  27  53 
Romania  48  52  59  69 
Slovakia  25  27  25  49 
Slovenia  50  42  39  57 
CEEC-10  35  35  38  54 
         
Turkey  62  65  53  69 
Russia  37  33  40  40 
Ukraine  66  48  37  32 
Kazakhstan  na  na  28 
39 
 
         
       
All focus countries




Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) updated from estimates reported in Anderson and 
Swinnen (2008). 
a. Dispersion for each country is a simple 4-year average of the annual standard deviation 
around a weighted mean of NRAs across covered products.  
b. Unweighted average, that is, the simple average across the 14 countries of their 4-year 
simple average dispersion measures. 




Table 6: Components to nominal rates of assistance to agriculture, Eastern Europe and CIS, 1961 to 2007 
(percent)  
(a) CEE-10 
  1992-94  1995-99  2000-04  2005-07  
Covered products  10.4  16.4  25.5  17.7 
Non-covered products  10.6  17.3  26.9  24.7 
All agriculture (excl NPS)  10.5  16.7  26.1  21.3 
   All importables  19.1  32.1  45.2  31.7 
   All exportables  2.4  7.0  10.9  12.0 
Non-product-specific (NPS)  1.9  2.5  2.5  4.4 
All agriculture (incl NPS)  12.4  19.2  28.6  25.7 
Decoupled payments  0.6  0.8  2.9  12.1 
All agriculture (incl NPS & decoup.)  13.0  20.1  31.5  37.8 
All agric tradables (incl NPS)  12.9  19.5  26.4  15.9 
All non-agricultural tradables  5.7  4.9  4.4  4.6 









(b) Russia and Ukraine         
  1992-94  1995-99  2000-04  2005 
Covered products  -23.7  8.6  4.2  11.0 
Non-covered products  -23.9  11.3  6.2  14.1 
All agriculture (excl NPS)  -23.7  9.4  4.9  12.0 
   All importables  -25.4  20.3  24.7  22.9 
   All exportables  -21.5  -13.4  -15.3  -2.0 
Non-product-specific (NPS)  6.3  4.8  2.7  0.0 
All agriculture (incl NPS)  -17.4  14.2  7.5  12.0 
Decoupled payments  2.6  0.6  0.0  0.0 
All agriculture (incl NPS & decoup.)  -14.8  14.8  7.6  12.0 
All agric tradables (incl NPS)  -17.4  14.2  5.9  6.3 
All non-agricultural tradables  4.9  9.0  8.1  7.3 











  1961-64  1965-69  1970-74  1975-79  1980-84  1985-89  1990-94  1995-99  2000-04  2005-07 
Covered products  -18.8  -17.7  -6.9  -8.1  -29.5  4.0  19.7  21.2  20.0  29.4 
Non-covered products  -18.8  -17.7  -6.9  -8.1  -29.5  4.0  19.7  21.2  20.0  27.8 
All agriculture (excl NPS)  -18.8  -17.7  -6.9  -8.1  -29.5  4.0  19.7  21.2  20.0  28.8 
   All importables  -10.8  -9.6  5.8  19.7  -19.6  28.5  60.2  80.5  54.0  45.0 
   All exportables  -29.9  -28.4  -18.0  -23.3  -35.5  -8.1  2.5  -1.9  3.5  21.9 
Non-product-specific (NPS)  -0.1  -0.3  1.9  0.6  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  3.3  1.5 
All agriculture (incl NPS)  -18.9  -17.9  -5.0  -7.5  -29.2  4.0  19.7  21.2  23.2  30.3 
Decoupled payments  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  3.7  2.9 
All agriculture (incl NPS & decoup)  -18.9  -17.9  -5.0  -7.5  -29.1  4.1  19.7  21.2  26.9  33.2 
All agric tradables (incl NPS)  -18.9  -17.9  -5.0  -7.5  -29.2  4.0  19.7  21.2  20.4  23.5 
All non-agricultural tradables  60.5  140.8  49.6  55.7  32.8  20.5  10.0  2.3  0.9  0.5 
RRA  -46.5  -64.0  -35.9  -35.6  -46.6  -13.6  8.8  18.6  19.3  23.0 
 




Table 7: Gross subsidy equivalents of assistance to farmers, total and per farm worker, 
Eastern European and CIS focus countries,
a 1992 to 2007 
 
(a) Total (constant 2000 US$ million per year) 
 
   1992-95  1996-99  2000-03  2004-07
b 
         
Bulgaria  -671  -381  -17  197 
Czech Rep  784  632  711  689 
Estonia  -73  82  74  90 
Hungary  856  768  1205  920 
Latvia  -208  167  195  179 
Lithuania  -332  414  395  361 
Poland  1378  3106  857  4314 
Romania  1921  2064  3332  4073 
Slovakia  421  338  309  301 
Slovenia  431  483  381  143 
CEEC-10  4509  7674  7441  11265 
         
Turkey  4671  8033  6070  10525 
Russia  -1486  7394  3394  3100 
Ukraine  -4461  -70  -1157  -182 
Kazakhstan  na  na  -34  69 
         




Table 7 (continued): Gross subsidy equivalents of assistance to farmers, total and per farm 
worker, Eastern European and CIS focus countries,
a 1992 to 2007 
 
(b) Per person engaged in agriculture
c (constant 2000 US$ per year) 
 
   1992-95  1996-99  2000-03  2004-07 
         
Bulgaria  -1429  -1075  -65  1010 
Czech Rep  1423  1255  1581  1762 
Estonia  -678  898  931  1267 
Hungary  1335  1372  2494  2253 
Latvia  -1038  993  1333  1393 
Lithuania  -1113  1693  1932  2123 
Poland  283  683  204  1118 
Romania  879  1135  2202  3311 
Slovakia  1393  1199  1197  1281 
Slovenia
  10781  18225  22105  14254 
CEEC-10  466  893  977  1682 
         
Turkey  344  566  414  702 
Russia  -152  842  431  439 
Ukraine  -956  -17  -333  -60 
Kazakhstan  na  na  -27  59 
         
All focus countries   86  647  451  752 
 
Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), based on NRA estimates updated from Anderson 
and Swinnen (2008) and data on the number of farmers from FAOSTAT. 
a Gross subsidy equivalents including assistance to nontradables and non-product-specific 
assistance. The number of farmers in these countries is difficult to get on a consistent basis. 
The FAOSTAT numbers may be subject to error. For example, Slovenia’s may be 
understated in FAOSTAT, in which case its GSE per farmer is overestimated. 





Table 8: Percentage consumer tax equivalent of policies assisting producers of covered farm 
products,
a Eastern European and CIS focus countries, 1992 to 2007 
(percent, at primary product level) 
 
   1992-95  1996-99  2000-03  2004-07
e 
         
Bulgaria  -20  -10  3  7 
Czech Rep  23  19  22  20 
Estonia  -15  12  9  20 
Hungary  18  15  22  16 
Latvia  2  28  32  32 
Lithuania  -20  21  20  29 
Poland  4  2  18  25 
Romania  -6  16  39  29 
Slovakia  13  15  16  17 
Slovenia  48  58  45  24 
CEEC-10  2  11  24  23 
         
Turkey  10  20  16  9 
Russia  -37  13  16  24 
Ukraine  -25  0  -3  3 
Kazakhstan  na  na  4  16 
All focus countries:         
  Unweighted average
  -1  16  19  20 
  Weighted average
b  -13  13  16  14 
  Dispersion of national 
CTEs
c  27  17  14  10 
Dispersion of region’s  
    product CTEs
d  35  37  47  53 
 
Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) updated from estimates reported in Anderson and 
Swinnen (2008). 
a. Assumes the CTE is the same as the NRA derived from trade measures (that is, not 
including any input taxes/subsidies or domestic producer price subsidies/taxes).  
 b. Weights are consumption valued at undistorted prices, where consumption (from FAO) is 
production plus imports net of exports plus change in stocks of the covered products. 
c. Simple 4-year average of the annual standard deviation around a weighted mean of the 
regional average CTE across the covered products. 
d. Simple 4-year average of the annual standard deviation around a weighted mean of the 
national average CTE for covered products. 
e. Final column refers just to 2004-05 for Russia and Ukraine and 2004 for Kazakhstan; and 
CEEC values assume the CTE for each product is the same as for the EU-25 in 2004-06 and 
for EU-27 in 2007, such that the differences across CEE countries is due to differing national 








Annual estimates of rates of assistance,  
Eastern European and Central Asian countries,  





Compiled using country author spreadsheets with the assistance of Ernesto 
Valenzuela, Johanna Croser and Signe Nelgen at the University of Adelaide  
and Marianne Kurzweil now at the African Development Bank 




Appendix Table 1: Growth of real GDP, Eastern European and Central Asian 
countries, 1990 to 2004 
 
(at constant 2000 prices, percent per year, trend-based) 
 
  Agriculture  Industry  Services  Total GDP 
  1990-94  1995-04  1990-94  1995-04  1990-94  1995-04  1990-94  1995-04 
CEE-8  na  1.7  na  3.4  na  3.9  -2.0  3.7 
Bulgaria  -11.6  3.4  -6.6  1.8  -1.3  2.7  -4.0  2.5 
Romania  -2.3  0.1  -4.6  1.3  -4.5  1.9  -4.2  1.5 
Turkey  0.7  0.8  4.3  1.9  3.4  3.4  3.2  2.7 
CEE-11  na  1.0  na  2.8  na  3.6  -0.6  3.2 
CIS-7  -6.4  1.7  -16.8  3.0  -6.9  1.9  -10.8  2.2 




















Source: Sandri, Valenzuela and Anderson (2008), compiled from World Bank’s 




Appendix Table 2: Sectoral shares of GDP, Eastern European and Central Asian 




  Agriculture   Industry   Services 
  1992  1996  2000  2004  1992  1996  2000  2004  1992  1996  2000  2004 
CEE-8  7  5  3  3  39  32  30  29  55  63  66  68 
Bulgaria  12  14  12  9  39  29  27  26  49  57  61  65 
Romania  19  19  11  13  43  40  32  33  38  41  57  54 
Turkey  14  16  13  11  27  25  22  19  59  59  65  71 
CEE-11  11  10  8  6  34  30  27  26  55  60  65  68 
CIS-7  11  8  8  6  43  35  33  31  46  57  59  63 




























Source: Sandri, Valenzuela and Anderson (2008), compiled from World Bank’s 




Appendix Table 3: Agriculture’s shares of employment, Eastern European and 




  1992  1996  2000  2003 
CEE-8  20  18  16  15 
Bulgaria  12  9  7  6 
Romania  22  18  15  13 
Turkey  49  47  44  41 
CEE-11  30  28  26  24 
CIS-7  18  16  15  14 
Other  25  22  20  18 
All ECA  23  21  19  18 
 




Appendix Table 4: Sectoral shares of merchandise exports, Eastern European and 




  Agriculture and 
processed food 
Other primary  Other goods 
  1995  2004  1995  2004  1995  2004 
CEE-8  14  8  10  7  76  85 
Bulgaria  21
a  13  16
a  20  63
a  67 
Romania  10  6  11  11  79  83 
Turkey  21  10  5  5  74  85 
             
Russia  5
a  4  53
a  58  26
a  21 








Kyrgyz Rep.  35  31  24  26  41  43 
             
a 1996        
b 2000-02 
 
Source: Sandri, Valenzuela and Anderson (2008), compiled from World Bank’s 




Appendix Table 5: Index of revealed comparative advantage in agriculture and 
processed food,
a Eastern European and Central Asian countries, 1995 and 2004 
 
(world = 1.0) 
 
  RCA index 
  1995  2004 
     
CEE-8  1.2  0.9 
Bulgaria  1.9
b  1.4 
Romania  0.8  0.7 
Turkey  1.8  1.2 
     
Russia  0.4
b  0.5 




Kyrgyz Rep.  3.0  3.6 
     
 
a Share of agriculture and processed food in national exports as a ratio of that sector’s 
share of global exports          
b 1996     
c 2000-02 
 
Source: Sandri, Valenzuela and Anderson (2008), compiled from World Bank’s 




Appendix Table 6: Exports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP, Eastern 




  1995  2004 
     
CEE-8  36  59 
Bulgaria  54  58 
Romania  24  37 
Turkey  22  29 
     
Russia  19  35 
Kazakhstan  28  54 
Ukraine  25  60 
Kyrgyz Rep.  22  42 
     
 
Source: Sandri, Valenzuela and Anderson (2008), compiled from World Bank’s 




Appendix Table 7: Annual distortion estimates, Bulgaria, 1992 to 2007 
(a) Nominal rates of assistance




y   Beef   Egg   Maize   Milk   Oat  
Pigme
















1992  -31  -40  1  -21  -32  na  -37  na  -27  na  na  -19  na  -34  -39  na  -38  na  -31 
1993  14  -36  2  19  10  na  -7  na  -4  na  na  -14  na  -43  -30  na  -1  na  -3 
1994  -19  -37  -5  -20  -11  na  -18  na  -13  na  na  -41  na  -29  -41  na  -32  na  -22 
1995  -43  -23  12  -21  25  na  -15  na  -7  na  na  15  na  -26  -40  na  -45  na  -18 
1996  -15  -55  -13  -21  -41  na  -48  na  -32  na  na  -51  na  -26  -36  na  -18  na  -36 
1997  3  -33  2  -4  -15  na  -15  na  3  na  na  1  na  0  -29  na  0  na  -9 
1998  10  -2  18  -6  64  na  7  na  26  na  na  -47  na  18  -20  na  -14  na  4 
1999  -15  -26  35  -17  -7  na  16  na  33  na  na  -20  na  41  -24  na  -11  na  -5 
2000  -10  2  13  1  15  na  5  na  25  na  na  -29  na  14  -11  na  -2  na  1 
2001  -14  30  5  8  -19  na  -14  na  14  na  na  32  na  16  -15  na  -4  na  -5 
2002  -20  47  38  -14  -24  na  -1  na  41  na  na  28  na  8  -16  na  -19  na  -9 
2003  2  40  23  6  20  na  2  na  90  na  na  29  na  73  -7  na  9  na  15 
2004  2  6  10  32  62  na  24  na  135  na  na  43  na  91  -27  na  13  na  20 
2005  -23  -6  13  -12  -4  na  34  na  113  na  na  42  na  159  -7  na  -35  na  -2 
2006  -22  -6  23  -23  -2  na  11  na  80  na  na  -4  na  76  -13  na  -23  na  -6 
2007  0  66  0  21  0  0  18  10  100  0  1  68  0  99  0  0  0  1  9 





Appendix Table 7 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Bulgaria, 1992 to 2007 
(b) Nominal and relative rates of assistance to all
a agricultural products, to exportable
b 
and import-competing
 b agricultural industries, and relative
c to non-agricultural 
industries          (percent) 
  
Total ag NRA  Ag tradables NRA 
Non-ag 
tradables 
NRA  RRA 










competing  All  Inputs  Outputs 
1992  1  -32  -33  -31  -32  -34  -32  na  na 
1993  3  -6  -5  -3  -1  -12  -2  na  na 
1994  2  -25  -23  -23  -24  -25  -22  na  na 
1995  1  -19  -21  -19  -29  -6  -20  na  na 
1996  1  -37  -35  -36  -40  -29  -35  na  na 
1997  0  -9  -10  -9  -13  -4  -9  na  na 
1998  0  4  7  6  -9  18  8  na  na 
1999  1  -5  -4  -4  -11  11  -4  na  na 
2000  0  1  4  2  -6  11  5  na  na 
2001  0  -5  -7  -6  -9  6  -7  5  -11 
2002  1  -10  -12  -10  -14  19  -11  5  -16 
2003  2  13  12  13  7  25  13  9  3 
2004  2  18  17  18  6  53  13  9  3 
2005  0  -2  8  4  -16  40  -5  9  -13 
2006  0  -6  7  -3  -16  12  -8  9  -16 
2007  0  9  -10  7  4  36  7  9  -1 
a. NRAs including assistance to nontradables and non-product specific assistance.
 
b. NRAs including products specific input subsidies.  





t are the percentage NRAs for 




Appendix Table 7 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Bulgaria, 1992 to 2007 
(c) Value shares of primary production of covered




y   Beef   Egg   Maize   Milk   Oat  
Pigme
















1992  3  5  2  4  8  na  13  na  3  na  na  4  na  0  3  na  10  na  45 
1993  3  7  3  3  9  na  13  na  4  na  na  6  na  0  3  na  13  na  36 
1994  3  6  3  5  9  na  10  na  3  na  na  5  na  0  5  na  12  na  38 
1995  3  4  3  6  6  na  12  na  3  na  na  3  na  0  5  na  12  na  42 
1996  2  5  3  5  9  na  14  na  4  na  na  6  na  0  3  na  8  na  41 
1997  2  4  2  5  7  na  13  na  3  na  na  3  na  0  2  na  12  na  46 
1998  1  3  2  4  6  na  12  na  3  na  na  3  na  0  5  na  11  na  48 
1999  2  3  2  6  9  na  8  na  3  na  na  5  na  0  5  na  9  na  48 
2000  3  4  3  5  10  na  12  na  4  na  na  7  na  0  4  na  13  na  36 
2001  3  1  3  3  15  na  3  na  4  na  na  2  na  0  3  na  15  na  47 
2002  3  1  2  5  10  na  3  na  1  na  na  2  na  0  5  na  13  na  55 
2003  2  1  4  5  8  na  4  na  2  na  na  2  na  0  7  na  9  na  54 
2004  4  1  2  7  6  na  3  na  1  na  na  2  na  0  9  na  14  na  50 
2005  2  2  2  5  7  na  4  na  2  na  na  2  na  0  7  na  11  na  57 
2006  2  1  2  6  11  na  4  na  2  na  na  2  na  0  9  na  12  na  48 
2007  4  2  3  2  3  0  5  2  2  1  0  3  0  0  10  4  23  12  24 










y   Beef   Egg  
 
Maize   Milk   Oat  
Pigme












o   Wheat   Wine  
1992  X  X  X  X  X  na  X  na  X  na  na  X  na  M  X  na  X  na 
1993  X  M  X  M  X  na  M  na  X  na  na  X  na  M  X  na  X  na 
1994  X  M  X  X  X  na  M  na  X  na  na  X  na  M  X  na  X  na 
1995  X  M  X  X  M  na  M  na  X  na  na  X  na  M  X  na  X  na 
1996  X  M  X  M  X  na  X  na  X  na  na  X  na  M  X  na  M  na 
1997  M  M  X  X  X  na  X  na  M  na  na  M  na  M  X  na  M  na 
1998  X  M  X  X  M  na  M  na  M  na  na  M  na  M  X  na  X  na 
1999  X  M  X  X  X  na  M  na  M  na  na  X  na  M  X  na  X  na 
2000  X  M  X  X  M  na  M  na  M  na  na  X  na  M  X  na  X  na 
2001  X  M  X  M  X  na  M  na  M  na  na  X  na  M  X  na  X  na 
2002  X  M  X  X  X  na  M  na  M  na  na  X  na  M  X  na  X  na 
2003  X  M  X  X  M  na  M  na  M  na  na  X  na  M  X  na  X  na 
2004  X  M  X  X  M  na  M  na  M  na  na  X  na  M  X  na  X  na 
2005  X  M  X  X  M  na  M  na  M  na  na  X  na  M  X  na  X  na 
2006  X  M  X  X  M  na  M  na  M  na  na  X  na  M  X  na  X  na 
2007  X  M  X  X  M  X  M  X  M  X  X  X  X  M  X  X  X  X 
Sources: Ciaian and Swinnen (2007) and OECD (2007) 
a. Exportable (X), import-competing (M) and nontradables (H). 





Appendix Table 8: Annual distortion estimates, Czech Republic, 1992 to 2007 
(a) Nominal rates of assistance
a to covered products 
 (percent) 
   Barley   Beef   Egg    Maize   Milk   Oat  
Pigmea












1992  4  77  15  na  47  na  -12  na  49  18  na  51  na  na  -2  19 
1993  40  32  2  na  61  na  18  na  51  -4  na  32  na  na  15  34 
1994  15  26  16  na  48  na  11  na  49  -26  na  2  na  na  -1  20 
1995  -29  22  29  na  40  na  4  na  35  -23  na  13  na  na  -34  6 
1996  -28  24  15  na  44  na  6  na  33  -20  na  20  na  na  -25  8 
1997  -11  6  35  na  52  na  -12  na  33  -20  na  5  na  na  -9  9 
1998  18  16  51  na  98  na  32  na  53  -22  na  17  na  na  4  39 
1999  -17  26  51  na  52  na  38  na  31  -16  na  13  na  na  -6  29 
2000  -25  31  36  na  27  na  16  na  28  -6  na  18  na  na  -11  19 
2001  -5  19  26  na  31  na  37  na  36  10  na  21  na  na  4  31 
2002  1  26  14  na  71  na  19  na  59  -4  na  30  na  na  -1  34 
2003  -7  41  3  na  78  na  18  na  55  8  na  58  na  na  1  39 
2004  0  -125  0  na  87  na  36  na  103  0  na  193  na  na  0  30 
2005  0  109  0  19  33  24  19  10  69  0  0  168  0  0  0  21 
2006  0  81  0  11  25  0  14  10  69  0  0  62  0  0  0  16 
2007  0  66  0  21  0  0  18  10  100  0  0  99  0  0  0  11 




Appendix Table 8 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Czech Republic, 1992 to 2007 
(b) Nominal and relative rates of assistance to all
a agricultural products, to exportable
b and import-competing
 b agricultural industries, and 
relative
c to non-agricultural industries          (percent) 
 
  
Total ag NRA  Ag tradables NRA 
Non-ag 
tradables 
NRA  RRA 









competing  All  Inputs  Outputs 
1992  1  18  20  20  32  0  20  na  na 
1993  3  31  33  32  31  40  32  na  na 
1994  2  18  20  22  20  16  22  na  na 
1995  3  3  5  7  1  10  7  na  na 
1996  3  5  6  8  3  11  8  6  2 
1997  4  5  6  8  6  1  8  6  2 
1998  7  31  35  36  29  40  36  6  28 
1999  8  21  23  25  3  44  25  3  22 
2000  7  12  13  16  1  24  16  3  13 
2001  9  21  24  25  8  35  25  3  22 
2002  8  26  30  31  7  48  31  4  25 
2003  10  29  33  35  11  49  35  4  29 
2004  0  30  49  23  21  53  26  5  20 
2005  0  21  35  22  18  31  19  5  13 
2006  0  16  26  19  12  27  14  5  9 
2007  0  11  18  13  6  38  9  5  4 
a. NRAs including assistance to nontradables and non-product specific assistance.
 
b. NRAs including products specific input subsidies.  





t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural 




Appendix Table 8 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Czech Republic, 1992 to 2007 
(c) Value shares of primary production of covered
a and non-covered products,  
(percent) 
   Barley   Beef   Egg   Maize   Milk   Oat  
Pigmea












1992  5  6  3  na  13  na  21  na  2  1  na  2  na  na  8  39 
1993  5  8  4  na  13  na  16  na  2  2  na  3  na  na  8  39 
1994  5  7  4  na  12  na  15  na  3  3  na  2  na  na  10  39 
1995  6  7  3  na  11  na  15  na  2  4  na  2  na  na  12  39 
1996  7  6  3  na  10  na  16  na  2  3  na  2  na  na  13  38 
1997  8  7  3  na  9  na  17  na  3  3  na  2  na  na  12  36 
1998  5  7  4  na  10  na  15  na  4  5  na  2  na  na  12  36 
1999  6  6  3  na  12  na  11  na  4  5  na  2  na  na  11  39 
2000  5  5  4  na  14  na  13  na  4  5  na  2  na  na  12  35 
2001  6  4  4  na  13  na  15  na  5  5  na  2  na  na  12  33 
2002  6  5  4  na  13  na  14  na  4  5  na  3  na  na  11  35 
2003  8  6  5  na  13  na  15  na  5  3  na  2  na  na  9  35 
2004  7  6  5  na  15  na  17  na  5  5  na  3  na  na  13  24 
2005  9  5  5  2  5  0  15  4  5  7  0  1  1  0  17  24 
2006  8  5  4  2  6  1  14  4  4  8  0  2  1  0  16  24 
2007  11  3  3  3  8  1  9  3  3  9  0  1  1  0  22  24 








   Barley   Beef   Egg   Maize  Milk   Oat  
Pigmea








o   Wheat  
1992  X  X  X  na  X  na  M  na  M  X  na  M  na  na  X 
1993  M  X  X  na  X  na  X  na  X  X  na  X  na  na  X 
1994  X  M  X  na  X  na  M  na  X  X  na  X  na  na  X 
1995  X  X  X  na  X  na  M  na  M  X  na  M  na  na  X 
1996  X  X  X  na  X  na  M  na  M  X  na  X  na  na  X 
1997  X  X  X  na  X  na  X  na  M  X  na  X  na  na  M 
1998  X  X  X  na  X  na  M  na  M  X  na  X  na  na  X 
1999  X  X  X  na  M  na  M  na  M  X  na  X  na  na  X 
2000  X  X  X  na  M  na  M  na  M  X  na  X  na  na  X 
2001  X  X  X  na  M  na  M  na  M  X  na  M  na  na  X 
2002  X  X  X  na  M  na  M  na  M  X  na  X  na  na  X 
2003  X  X  X  na  M  na  M  na  M  X  na  X  na  na  X 
2004  X  X  X  na  X  na  M  na  M  X  na  X  na  na  X 
2005  X  X  X  X  X  X  M  X  M  X  X  X  X  X  X 
2006  X  X  X  X  X  X  M  X  M  X  X  X  X  X  X 
2007  X  X  X  X  X  X  M  X  M  X  X  X  X  X  X 
Sources: Ciaian and Swinnen (2007) and OECD (2007) 
a. Exportable (X), import-competing (M) and nontradables (H). 






Appendix Table 9: Annual distortion estimates, Estonia, 1992 to 2007 
(a) Nominal rates of assistance








at   Potato  
Poultr
y   Rye  
Tomat




1992  -28  -57  -41  -41  -46  22  -50  na  -34  22  na  6  -39 
1993  -7  -30  -32  -22  -38  -3  -22  na  6  -14  na  -6  -22 
1994  -10  -23  -15  -10  -28  -14  15  na  34  10  na  -1  -8 
1995  16  -29  14  14  -4  16  0  na  60  36  na  1  4 
1996  9  -23  11  29  20  -2  -5  na  60  20  na  1  10 
1997  13  -31  26  31  50  -1  -12  na  48  22  na  14  11 
1998  70  -8  25  42  29  18  42  na  47  98  na  43  37 
1999  33  -21  53  -7  50  36  45  na  29  61  na  35  9 
2000  3  -26  23  15  22  25  26  na  34  34  na  13  13 
2001  1  16  26  8  6  42  18  na  28  21  na  10  12 
2002  18  21  11  23  -14  30  19  na  69  -3  na  17  21 
2003  11  0  5  42  -8  22  20  na  78  3  na  9  26 
2004  0  -125  0  87  1  0  36  na  103  na  na  0  36 
2005  0  109  0  33  24  0  19  10  69  na  0  0  20 
2006  0  81  0  25  0  0  14  10  69  na  0  0  15 
2007  0  66  0  0  0  0  18  10  100  na  0  0  7 




Appendix Table 9 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Estonia, 1992 to 2007 
(b) Nominal and relative rates of assistance to all
a agricultural products, to exportable
b and import-competing
 b agricultural industries, and 
relative
c to non-agricultural industries          (percent) 
  
  
Total ag NRA  Ag tradables NRA 
Non-ag 
tradables 
NRA  RRA 









competing  All  Inputs  Outputs 
1992  0  -39  -39  -38  -51  -31  -38  na  na 
1993  0  -22  -22  -20  -26  -18  -20  na  na 
1994  0  -8  -8  -6  -21  -3  -6  na  na 
1995  1  4  4  8  -18  12  8  0  8 
1996  2  9  10  13  -2  10  13  0  12 
1997  2  10  11  14  -1  11  14  0  13 
1998  11  26  37  41  23  38  41  0  40 
1999  10  -1  9  13  -5  40  13  0  12 
2000  9  4  13  15  25  12  15  1  14 
2001  8  4  12  13  10  15  13  1  12 
2002  12  9  21  23  21  21  23  1  22 
2003  12  14  26  30  14  27  30  1  29 
2004  0  36  36  23  87  1  36  0  36 
2005  0  20  20  18  24  18  14  0  14 
2006  0  15  15  16  19  13  11  0  11 
2007  0  7  7  9  3  8  4  0  4 
 
 
a. NRAs including assistance to nontradables and non-product specific assistance.
 
b. NRAs including products specific input subsidies.  





t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural 




Appendix Table 9 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Estonia, 1992 to 2007 
(c) Value shares of primary production of covered








at   Potato  
Poultr
y   Rye  
Tomat




1992  5  8  4  24  1  0  11  na  2  3  na  2  41 
1993  7  15  3  23  2  0  9  na  1  3  na  2  35 
1994  5  11  4  22  1  0  8  na  1  1  na  1  46 
1995  6  11  3  23  1  0  11  na  1  1  na  2  41 
1996  9  9  4  22  3  0  11  na  1  2  na  3  37 
1997  7  8  3  23  2  0  13  na  1  1  na  3  37 
1998  5  8  4  26  2  1  12  na  2  1  na  3  37 
1999  3  9  3  25  1  1  8  na  2  1  na  2  46 
2000  8  6  3  25  2  2  9  na  2  1  na  4  39 
2001  6  4  3  31  2  2  12  na  2  1  na  3  35 
2002  5  5  3  24  2  3  13  na  2  1  na  3  38 
2003  6  4  4  22  1  4  12  na  3  1  na  4  41 
2004  6  5  3  25  2  3  11  na  2  na  na  3  39 
2005  11  4  3  9  2  5  10  6  2  na  0  8  41 
2006  10  4  3  10  2  6  10  7  2  na  0  8  38 
2007  14  2  2  12  2  7  6  4  1  na  0  12  38 
 














at   Potato  
Poultr
y   Rye  
Tomat
o   Wheat  
1992  M  X  X  M  M  X  X  na  M  M  na  M 
1993  M  X  X  M  M  X  X  na  M  X  na  M 
1994  M  X  X  M  M  X  M  na  M  M  na  M 
1995  M  X  X  M  M  X  M  na  M  M  na  M 
1996  M  M  M  M  M  X  M  na  M  M  na  M 
1997  M  M  M  M  M  X  M  na  M  M  na  M 
1998  M  M  X  M  M  X  M  na  M  M  na  M 
1999  M  X  X  X  M  X  M  na  M  M  na  M 
2000  M  M  M  M  M  X  M  na  M  M  na  M 
2001  M  M  M  X  M  X  M  na  M  M  na  M 
2002  M  M  M  X  X  M  M  na  M  M  na  M 
2003  M  M  M  M  X  X  M  na  M  M  na  M 
2004  M  M  M  X  M  M  M  na  M  na  na  M 
2005  M  M  M  X  M  M  M  X  M  na  X  M 
2006  M  M  M  X  M  M  M  X  M  na  X  M 
2007  M  M  M  X  M  M  M  X  M  na  X  M 
 
Sources: Ciaian and Swinnen (2007) and OECD (2007) 
a. Exportable (X), import-competing (M) and nontradables (H). 




Appendix Table 10: Annual distortion estimates, Hungary, 1992 to 2007 
(a) Nominal rates of assistance




y   Beef   Egg   Maize  Milk   Oat  
Pigme

















1992  -10  46  63  -4  48  na  17  23  20  na  na  46  na  100  -24  na  -18  na  20 
1993  27  18  52  25  72  na  30  15  29  na  na  -7  na  84  -36  na  14  na  33 
1994  15  25  59  -3  76  na  44  -7  37  na  na  -12  na  70  -17  na  -3  na  28 
1995  -31  15  60  -13  42  na  30  -2  33  na  na  -3  na  65  -11  na  -35  na  11 
1996  3  -1  34  -13  28  na  6  17  33  na  na  7  na  75  -7  na  -4  na  11 
1997  -10  -13  63  -25  58  na  7  52  32  na  na  -7  na  94  -10  na  -15  na  9 
1998  19  -7  81  -23  111  na  46  3  39  na  na  17  na  81  -9  na  -9  na  29 
1999  9  5  96  -12  97  na  39  9  28  na  na  -49  na  129  -2  na  16  na  32 
2000  -1  4  68  -1  55  na  15  35  37  na  na  -53  na  95  -5  na  13  na  28 
2001  -2  6  82  -25  60  na  37  21  48  na  na  -52  na  111  1  na  -11  na  26 
2002  7  8  27  -9  116  na  47  83  61  na  na  -48  na  232  15  na  10  na  52 
2003  -15  7  -10  32  113  na  23  86  51  na  na  -48  na  287  1  na  28  na  48 
2004  0  -125  0  -25  87  na  36  10  103  na  na  47  na  193  0  na  0  na  25 
2005  0  109  0  19  33  24  19  10  69  0  2  54  0  168  0  0  0  2  18 
2006  0  81  0  11  25  0  14  10  69  0  3  74  0  62  0  0  0  1  14 
2007  0  66  0  21  0  0  18  10  100  0  1  68  0  99  0  0  0  1  13 




Appendix Table 10 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Hungary, 1992 to 2007 
(b) Nominal and relative rates of assistance to all
a agricultural products, to exportable
b and import-competing
 b agricultural industries, and 
relative
c to non-agricultural industries          (percent) 
  
  
Total ag NRA  Ag tradables NRA 
Non-ag 
tradables 
NRA  RRA 









competing  All  Inputs  Outputs 
1992  4  16  16  16  15  23  16  10  5 
1993  5  28  28  28  22  50  28  9  17 
1994  5  23  23  24  15  42  24  9  13 
1995  3  7  7  7  4  21  7  9  -1 
1996  4  7  7  7  7  3  7  8  -2 
1997  4  5  5  7  5  na  7  4  2 
1998  8  21  21  26  22  3  26  4  21 
1999  7  25  25  33  25  9  33  4  27 
2000  7  22  22  26  22  18  26  4  21 
2001  9  17  17  23  13  51  23  4  18 
2002  17  35  35  45  34  38  45  8  34 
2003  14  34  34  43  32  61  43  8  32 
2004  0  25  30  19  26  10  25  8  16 
2005  0  18  22  20  19  10  18  8  10 
2006  0  14  16  17  14  10  14  8  6 
2007  0  13  16  15  14  10  13  8  5 
 
 
a. NRAs including assistance to nontradables and non-product specific assistance.
 
b. NRAs including products specific input subsidies.  





t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural 




Appendix Table 10 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Hungary, 1992 to 2007 
(c) Value shares of primary production of covered




y   Beef   Egg  Maize  Milk  Oat  
Pigme
















1992  3  3  4  9  7  na  18  3  8  na  na  1  na  1  4  na  8  na  31 
1993  2  4  4  10  7  na  17  4  8  na  na  1  na  1  4  na  7  na  32 
1994  3  3  4  11  6  na  14  4  7  na  na  1  na  1  4  na  10  na  32 
1995  3  2  2  10  6  na  13  5  7  na  na  1  na  1  4  na  11  na  34 
1996  2  2  3  14  5  na  14  2  6  na  na  1  na  1  3  na  10  na  37 
1997  3  2  3  15  6  na  15  1  8  na  na  1  na  1  2  na  13  na  31 
1998  2  2  2  13  6  na  12  3  8  na  na  1  na  1  4  na  10  na  34 
1999  2  2  2  17  7  na  12  3  9  na  na  1  na  1  4  na  5  na  34 
2000  2  2  3  12  8  na  16  2  10  na  na  1  na  1  2  na  9  na  31 
2001  3  2  3  17  8  na  14  2  10  na  na  1  na  1  3  na  11  na  27 
2002  3  2  3  15  7  na  13  1  9  na  na  1  na  1  5  na  8  na  32 
2003  3  2  4  11  7  na  16  1  9  na  na  1  na  0  5  na  7  na  32 
2004  3  2  4  15  8  na  16  2  11  na  na  1  na  1  4  na  10  na  24 
2005  3  1  3  16  4  0  10  1  7  1  0  1  0  1  6  2  11  9  24 
2006  2  1  3  17  4  0  9  2  6  2  0  1  0  1  6  2  11  8  24 
2007  4  1  3  10  7  0  8  2  5  3  0  0  0  0  7  3  15  8  24 










y   Beef   Egg   Maize   Milk   Oat  
Pigme












o   Wheat   Wine  
1992  X  X  X  X  X  na  X  M  X  na  na  X  na  X  X  na  X  na 
1993  M  X  X  X  M  na  X  M  X  na  na  X  na  M  X  na  X  na 
1994  M  M  M  X  M  na  X  M  X  na  na  X  na  M  X  na  X  na 
1995  X  X  X  X  M  na  X  M  X  na  na  X  na  X  X  na  X  na 
1996  M  X  X  X  X  na  X  X  X  na  na  X  na  X  X  na  X  na 
1997  X  X  X  X  X  na  X  X  X  na  na  X  na  X  X  na  X  na 
1998  X  X  X  X  X  na  X  M  X  na  na  X  na  X  X  na  X  na 
1999  X  X  X  X  X  na  X  M  X  na  na  X  na  X  X  na  X  na 
2000  X  M  X  X  X  na  X  M  X  na  na  X  na  X  X  na  X  na 
2001  X  M  M  X  X  na  X  M  X  na  na  X  na  M  X  na  X  na 
2002  X  M  X  X  X  na  X  M  X  na  na  X  na  X  X  na  X  na 
2003  X  M  X  X  X  na  X  M  X  na  na  X  na  M  X  na  X  na 
2004  X  X  X  X  X  na  X  M  X  na  na  X  na  X  X  na  X  na 
2005  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  M  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X 
2006  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  M  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X 
2007  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  M  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X 
 
Sources: Ciaian and Swinnen (2007) and OECD (2007) 
a. Exportable (X), import-competing (M) and nontradables (H). 





Appendix Table 11: Annual distortion estimates, Kazakhstan, 2000 to 2004 
(a) Nominal rates of assistance
a to covered products 
 (percent) 
   Beef  Milk 
Pigme




2000  -38  -2  63  8  -5  -1  -13 
2001  -3  -3  46  -4  -3  -8  -4 
2002  -1  0  39  4  21  4  3 
2003  36  -4  82  3  28  2  -18 
2004  68  8  59  13  21  -16  -8 




Appendix Table 11 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Kazakhstan, 2000 to 2004 
(b) Nominal and relative rates of assistance to all
a agricultural products, to exportable
b and import-competing
 b agricultural industries, and 
relative
c to non-agricultural industries          (percent) 
  
  
Total ag NRA  Ag tradables NRA 
Non-ag 
tradables 
NRA  RRA 









competing  All  Inputs  Outputs 
2000  0  -13  -13  na  1  -21  -8  2  -10 
2001  0  -4  -4  na  -10  2  -4  2  -6 
2002  0  3  3  na  2  5  2  2  0 
2003  0  -18  -18  na  -6  -22  -12  2  -14 
2004  0  -8  -8  -5  -17  2  -8  2  -10 
 
 
a. NRAs including assistance to nontradables and non-product specific assistance.
 
b. NRAs including products specific input subsidies.  





t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural 




Appendix Table 11 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Kazakhstan, 2000 to 2004 
(c) Value shares of primary production of covered
a and non-covered products,  
(percent) 
   Beef  Milk 
Pigme




2000  26  10  2  4  2  13  43 
2001  7  10  3  5  3  23  49 
2002  8  11  4  4  2  16  55 
2003  3  7  2  4  1  10  73 
2004  3  7  2  3  2  18  65 
 








   Beef  Milk 
Pigme
at  Potato  Sugar  Wheat 
2000  M  M  M  X  M  X 
2001  M  M  M  M  M  X 
2002  M  M  M  M  M  X 
2003  M  M  M  M  M  X 
2004  M  M  M  X  M  X 
 
Sources: Pomfret (2007a)  
a. Exportable (X), import-competing (M) and nontradables (H). 





Appendix Table 12: Annual distortion estimates, Latvia, 1992 to 2007 
(a) Nominal rates of assistance








at   Potato  
Poultr
y   Rye   Sugar  
Tomat




1992  -30  -78  -44  -69  -44  9  -61  na  -56  -5  65  na  -24  -46 
1993  -17  -66  0  -40  -38  -14  14  na  24  -34  78  na  -22  -25 
1994  -6  -32  22  -21  -11  -27  79  na  74  -14  78  na  -10  5 
1995  -22  -26  58  -19  -12  -22  27  na  70  17  55  na  -4  1 
1996  -9  -18  35  -13  0  -22  12  na  50  16  59  na  1  3 
1997  -3  -28  51  -7  41  10  6  na  59  18  83  na  5  12 
1998  27  -14  57  15  11  144  30  na  76  39  136  na  21  45 
1999  29  -2  64  6  61  26  122  na  87  72  126  na  20  46 
2000  19  -6  50  0  64  23  78  na  109  60  101  na  12  31 
2001  6  58  36  2  21  32  57  na  96  34  101  na  2  33 
2002  8  37  4  10  -15  5  35  na  153  -16  109  na  -9  33 
2003  -3  -10  -10  6  -6  -2  37  na  55  7  134  na  -6  26 
2004  0  -125  0  87  1  0  36  na  103  na  193  na  0  64 
2005  0  109  0  33  24  0  19  10  69  na  168  0  0  15 
2006  0  81  0  25  0  0  14  10  69  na  62  0  0  11 
2007  0  66  0  0  0  0  18  10  100  na  99  0  0  5 




Appendix Table 12 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Latvia, 1992 to 2007 
(b) Nominal and relative rates of assistance to all
a agricultural products, to exportable
b and import-competing
 b agricultural industries, and 
relative
c to non-agricultural industries          (percent) 
  
  
Total ag NRA  Ag tradables NRA 
Non-ag 
tradables 
NRA  RRA 









competing  All  Inputs  Outputs 
1992  0  -46  -46  -45  -47  -44  -45  na  na 
1993  0  -25  -25  -24  -46  27  -24  na  na 
1994  2  4  5  7  -22  51  7  na  na 
1995  2  -1  1  3  -9  25  3  na  na 
1996  1  2  3  5  -7  11  5  2  3 
1997  1  11  12  14  -2  27  14  3  10 
1998  6  39  45  48  20  62  48  3  44 
1999  10  37  46  54  37  48  54  3  50 
2000  8  23  31  38  49  30  38  3  34 
2001  5  28  33  40  14  37  40  2  37 
2002  6  27  33  35  53  18  35  2  32 
2003  9  17  26  31  46  10  31  2  28 
2004  0  64  64  39  0  82  39  3  36 
2005  0  15  15  15  3  35  10  3  7 
2006  0  11  11  13  4  25  7  3  5 
2007  0  5  5  8  3  9  4  3  1 
 
 
a. NRAs including assistance to nontradables and non-product specific assistance.
 
b. NRAs including products specific input subsidies.  





t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural 




Appendix Table 12 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Latvia, 1992 to 2007 
(c) Value shares of primary production of covered








at   Potato 
Poultr
y   Rye   Sugar  
Tomat




1992  3  10  2  18  1  0  5  na  1  2  5  na  3  50 
1993  3  15  2  19  1  0  7  na  1  3  5  na  3  40 
1994  5  13  2  22  1  0  8  na  2  1  6  na  3  36 
1995  3  9  2  22  1  0  9  na  1  1  6  na  4  42 
1996  7  5  3  23  1  0  7  na  1  2  6  na  8  37 
1997  5  5  3  22  1  0  8  na  1  2  9  na  7  37 
1998  4  6  3  22  1  0  6  na  1  1  14  na  6  36 
1999  4  5  3  25  1  0  5  na  1  1  12  na  7  34 
2000  5  5  4  26  1  0  6  na  1  1  10  na  8  32 
2001  3  3  4  24  1  0  6  na  1  1  12  na  7  37 
2002  3  2  4  19  1  1  6  na  1  2  12  na  8  41 
2003  4  3  5  18  1  1  5  na  1  1  9  na  8  43 
2004  4  4  4  22  1  1  6  na  1  na  11  na  8  38 
2005  8  3  6  2  2  6  5  12  1  na  1  0  14  39 
2006  6  3  6  2  2  6  5  15  1  na  1  0  14  39 
2007  7  1  5  9  2  7  2  10  1  na  0  0  17  39 
 














at   Potato  
Poultr
y   Rye   Sugar  
Tomat
o   Wheat  
1992  M  X  X  X  M  X  M  na  M  X  X  na  M 
1993  M  X  X  X  X  M  M  na  M  X  M  na  X 
1994  M  X  X  X  X  X  M  na  M  X  M  na  M 
1995  M  X  M  X  M  X  X  na  M  X  M  na  M 
1996  M  M  X  X  M  X  M  na  M  M  M  na  M 
1997  M  M  M  X  X  X  X  na  M  M  M  na  M 
1998  M  M  X  X  X  X  M  na  M  M  M  na  M 
1999  M  M  X  M  X  M  M  na  M  M  M  na  X 
2000  M  M  X  M  M  X  M  na  M  M  M  na  M 
2001  M  M  X  M  M  X  M  na  M  M  M  na  X 
2002  M  M  X  M  M  X  M  na  M  M  X  na  X 
2003  M  M  X  M  M  X  M  na  M  X  X  na  X 
2004  M  M  X  M  M  X  M  na  M  na  M  na  X 
2005  M  M  X  M  M  X  M  X  M  na  M  X  X 
2006  M  M  X  M  M  X  M  X  M  na  M  X  X 
2007  M  M  X  M  M  X  M  X  M  na  M  X  X 
 
Sources: Ciaian and Swinnen (2007) and OECD (2007) 
a. Exportable (X), import-competing (M) and nontradables (H). 





Appendix Table 13: Annual distortion estimates, Lithuania, 1992 to 2007 
(a) Nominal rates of assistance








at   Potato  
Poultr
y   Rye   Sugar  
Tomat




1992  -31  -71  -42  na  -74  -53  73  -47  na  -45  -9  107  na  -31  -46 
1993  -2  -48  -18  na  -57  -34  -39  14  na  19  -24  74  na  -21  -21 
1994  -15  -31  -1  na  -55  -39  -28  60  na  79  -31  35  na  -27  -18 
1995  -7  -24  22  na  -35  -16  -9  39  na  88  7  65  na  -6  0 
1996  -3  -18  14  na  -30  28  7  27  na  74  9  73  na  -1  3 
1997  7  -15  23  na  -20  51  -8  19  na  82  33  97  na  -1  14 
1998  24  28  18  na  3  12  -4  60  na  108  56  145  na  6  41 
1999  26  10  31  na  -11  36  -9  86  na  111  103  190  na  35  42 
2000  5  -10  14  na  -27  4  17  72  na  96  32  172  na  6  23 
2001  8  54  11  na  -28  3  20  51  na  86  17  116  na  11  18 
2002  31  38  -10  na  -9  -15  16  35  na  93  -5  149  na  26  33 
2003  17  -5  -6  na  -1  10  11  41  na  52  4  203  na  17  33 
2004  0  -125  0  na  87  1  0  36  na  103  na  193  na  0  55 
2005  0  109  0  19  33  24  0  19  10  69  na  168  0  0  18 
2006  0  81  0  11  25  0  0  14  10  69  na  62  0  0  15 
2007  0  66  0  21  0  0  0  18  10  100  na  99  0  0  7 




Appendix Table 13 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Lithuania, 1992 to 2007 
(b) Nominal and relative rates of assistance to all
a agricultural products, to exportable
b and import-competing
 b agricultural industries, and 
relative
c to non-agricultural industries          (percent) 
  
  
Total ag NRA  Ag tradables NRA 
Non-ag 
tradables 
NRA  RRA 









competing  All  Inputs  Outputs 
1992  0  -46  -46  -45  -70  -3  -45  na  na 
1993  0  -21  -21  -20  -50  20  -20  na  na 
1994  1  -20  -18  -15  -27  35  -15  na  na 
1995  2  -2  0  2  -11  24  2  3  0 
1996  2  1  3  6  -14  24  6  3  3 
1997  3  11  14  17  -7  56  17  2  14 
1998  4  37  41  45  19  98  45  2  41 
1999  2  40  42  47  36  64  47  2  43 
2000  2  21  23  27  17  38  27  2  24 
2001  3  14  18  22  13  33  22  2  19 
2002  6  27  33  38  32  34  38  1  37 
2003  8  25  33  39  3  80  39  1  38 
2004  0  55  55  35  64  29  53  1  51 
2005  0  18  18  17  20  15  17  1  15 
2006  0  15  15  16  17  13  14  1  13 
2007  0  7  7  9  6  9  6  1  5 
 
 
a. NRAs including assistance to nontradables and non-product specific assistance.
 
b. NRAs including products specific input subsidies.  





t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural 




Appendix Table 13 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Lithuania, 1992 to 2007 
(c) Value shares of primary production of covered








at   Potato  
Poultr
y   Rye   Sugar  
Tomat




1992  4  15  2  na  26  0  0  8  na  2  2  6  na  5  29 
1993  5  14  2  na  21  0  0  6  na  1  2  8  na  5  36 
1994  5  12  2  na  22  0  0  6  na  2  2  6  na  4  39 
1995  5  7  2  na  19  0  0  7  na  1  1  8  na  5  44 
1996  9  7  2  na  18  1  0  6  na  2  2  8  na  8  37 
1997  7  7  2  na  18  0  0  8  na  1  2  9  na  8  36 
1998  6  6  2  na  18  1  1  7  na  2  2  9  na  7  41 
1999  5  7  2  na  21  0  2  6  na  2  1  7  na  6  41 
2000  7  6  2  na  22  0  1  6  na  2  2  8  na  9  36 
2001  5  3  3  na  25  0  1  6  na  2  1  8  na  8  38 
2002  6  3  3  na  23  1  2  7  na  2  1  10  na  9  34 
2003  6  4  4  na  19  1  2  7  na  2  1  7  na  9  40 
2004  6  4  3  na  23  1  1  7  na  2  na  9  na  9  36 
2005  10  4  5  0  6  1  4  7  8  2  na  1  0  14  37 
2006  9  5  6  0  8  1  5  7  8  2  na  1  0  11  37 
2007  13  2  2  0  8  1  6  4  6  1  na  0  0  18  37 














at   Potato  
Poultr
y   Rye   Sugar  
Tomat
o   Wheat  
1992  M  X  X  na  X  M  M  M  na  X  M  M  na  M 
1993  M  X  X  na  X  M  M  M  na  X  M  M  na  M 
1994  X  X  X  na  X  M  X  M  na  X  M  X  na  X 
1995  M  X  X  na  X  M  X  X  na  X  X  M  na  M 
1996  M  X  X  na  X  M  X  X  na  M  M  M  na  M 
1997  M  X  X  na  X  M  X  X  na  M  M  M  na  X 
1998  M  X  X  na  X  M  X  X  na  M  X  M  na  X 
1999  M  X  X  na  X  M  X  M  na  M  X  X  na  X 
2000  M  X  M  na  X  M  X  M  na  M  X  X  na  X 
2001  M  X  M  na  X  M  X  M  na  M  X  X  na  X 
2002  M  X  X  na  X  M  X  M  na  M  M  X  na  X 
2003  M  X  X  na  X  M  X  M  na  M  M  M  na  X 
2004  M  X  X  na  X  M  X  M  na  M  na  X  na  X 
2005  M  X  X  X  X  M  X  M  X  M  na  X  X  X 
2006  M  X  X  X  X  M  X  M  X  M  na  X  X  X 
2007  M  X  X  X  X  M  X  M  X  M  na  X  X  X 
 
Sources: Ciaian and Swinnen (2007) and OECD (2007) 
a. Exportable (X), import-competing (M) and nontradables (H). 





Appendix Table 14: Annual distortion estimates, Poland, 1992 to 2007 
(a) Nominal rates of assistance

























1992  na  15  73  40  17  na  16  3  -32  na  59  10  na  26  na  na  10  -4 
1993  na  5  64  33  19  na  23  26  -7  na  33  4  na  14  na  na  23  14 
1994  na  16  92  29  5  na  38  9  9  na  66  22  na  18  na  na  11  19 
1995  na  13  94  24  18  na  12  5  -12  na  48  19  na  20  na  na  9  10 
1996  na  46  68  23  23  na  25  26  -16  na  54  11  na  35  na  na  28  17 
1997  na  29  59  28  34  na  9  25  -14  na  32  11  na  29  na  na  22  17 
1998  na  19  109  30  52  na  15  23  13  na  41  9  na  42  na  na  30  33 
1999  na  -12  98  0  39  na  11  24  18  na  30  -52  na  43  na  na  15  27 
2000  na  -34  55  -4  35  na  26  29  -18  na  12  -48  na  63  na  na  23  13 
2001  na  -30  18  7  35  na  11  6  -14  na  9  -12  na  40  na  na  19  10 
2002  na  -39  6  13  36  na  7  5  -20  na  10  -12  na  49  na  na  15  7 
2003  na  -44  -14  9  28  na  17  15  -29  na  2  -1  na  52  na  na  6  0 
2004  na  -125  0  -25  87  na  na  na  36  na  103  47  na  193  na  na  0  39 
2005  0  109  0  19  33  24  na  na  19  10  69  54  0  168  0  0  0  22 
2006  0  81  0  11  25  0  na  na  14  10  69  74  0  62  0  0  0  17 
2007  0  66  0  21  0  0  na  na  18  10  100  68  0  99  0  0  0  12 




Appendix Table 14 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Poland, 1992 to 2007 
(b) Nominal and relative rates of assistance to all
a agricultural products, to exportable
b and import-competing
 b agricultural industries, and 
relative
c to non-agricultural industries          (percent) 
  
  
Total ag NRA  Ag tradables NRA 
Non-ag 
tradables 
NRA  RRA 









competing  All  Inputs  Outputs 
1992  3  -7  -4  -2  -24  23  -2  10  -10 
1993  3  11  12  14  na  12  14  10  4 
1994  3  16  16  18  20  16  18  10  8 
1995  2  8  8  9  -7  19  9  6  3 
1996  2  15  16  18  4  36  17  8  8 
1997  3  13  14  18  7  28  18  7  10 
1998  4  29  30  34  17  43  34  5  27 
1999  3  24  25  27  16  38  27  3  23 
2000  3  10  11  13  -11  32  13  3  10 
2001  2  8  8  10  -8  23  10  2  7 
2002  2  5  5  8  4  9  7  3  4 
2003  2  -2  -3  0  -16  24  -2  2  -3 
2004  0  39  58  21  46  -3  39  3  35 
2005  0  22  33  18  26  3  22  3  19 
2006  0  17  25  16  19  1  17  3  14 
2007  0  12  18  11  14  2  12  3  9 
 
 
a. NRAs including assistance to nontradables and non-product specific assistance.
 
b. NRAs including products specific input subsidies.  





t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural 




Appendix Table 14 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Poland, 1992 to 2007 
(c) Value shares of primary production of covered
























1992  na  5  2  0  13  na  1  5  33  na  3  1  na  1  na  na  7  30 
1993  na  5  2  0  12  na  1  6  21  na  2  0  na  2  na  na  8  41 
1994  na  5  3  0  13  na  1  5  21  na  3  0  na  2  na  na  7  40 
1995  na  5  2  0  11  na  2  6  19  na  2  0  na  2  na  na  7  45 
1996  na  5  2  0  11  na  1  7  22  na  3  0  na  2  na  na  9  38 
1997  na  6  2  0  12  na  1  7  22  na  3  0  na  1  na  na  8  36 
1998  na  7  2  0  12  na  2  7  21  na  3  0  na  1  na  na  8  35 
1999  na  5  2  1  14  na  2  6  18  na  4  0  na  1  na  na  8  38 
2000  na  3  3  1  13  na  1  5  17  na  3  0  na  1  na  na  7  46 
2001  na  2  3  1  13  na  1  6  17  na  4  0  na  1  na  na  7  44 
2002  na  3  3  1  12  na  1  6  17  na  4  0  na  1  na  na  7  44 
2003  na  3  3  1  12  na  1  5  17  na  4  0  na  1  na  na  6  45 
2004  na  3  3  1  14  na  na  na  19  na  4  0  na  1  na  na  7  45 
2005  3  2  4  1  6  1  na  na  15  8  3  0  0  1  0  1  7  45 
2006  3  2  4  1  6  1  na  na  14  10  3  0  0  1  0  1  6  45 
2007  4  1  3  1  8  1  na  na  9  10  2  0  0  1  0  1  9  45 






























o   Wheat  
1992  na  M  M  M  M  na  X  X  X  na  M  X  na  X  na  na  M 
1993  na  M  M  M  M  na  M  M  M  na  M  M  na  M  na  na  M 
1994  na  X  M  M  M  na  X  M  M  na  M  M  na  X  na  na  M 
1995  na  X  M  M  M  na  M  M  X  na  M  X  na  M  na  na  M 
1996  na  X  M  M  X  na  X  M  X  na  M  X  na  M  na  na  M 
1997  na  X  M  M  X  na  M  M  X  na  M  X  na  X  na  na  M 
1998  na  X  M  M  M  na  X  M  X  na  X  X  na  M  na  na  M 
1999  na  X  M  M  M  na  M  M  X  na  X  X  na  X  na  na  X 
2000  na  X  M  M  M  na  X  M  X  na  X  X  na  X  na  na  M 
2001  na  X  X  M  M  na  M  M  X  na  X  X  na  M  na  na  M 
2002  na  X  X  M  X  na  X  M  X  na  X  M  na  X  na  na  X 
2003  na  X  X  M  M  na  M  M  X  na  X  M  na  M  na  na  X 
2004  na  X  X  M  X  na  na  na  X  na  X  X  na  X  na  na  M 
2005  na  X  X  M  X  X  na  na  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  M 
2006  X  X  X  M  X  X  na  na  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  M 
2007  X  X  X  M  X  X  na  na  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  M 
Sources: Ciaian and Swinnen (2007) and OECD (2007) 
a. Exportable (X), import-competing (M) and nontradables (H). 





Appendix Table 15: Annual distortion estimates, Romania, 1992 to 2007 
(a) Nominal rates of assistance




y   Beef   Egg   Maize   Milk   Oat  
Pigme
















1992  -11  33  7  15  -8  -24  -1  na  37  -31  na  -11  24  131  -15  na  33  na  15 
1993  100  -15  30  67  35  21  19  na  22  16  na  -58  89  172  -5  na  49  na  34 
1994  50  -28  47  15  65  -5  29  na  57  -39  na  -48  45  160  -12  na  56  na  39 
1995  -10  -26  71  -8  62  -1  21  na  40  -45  na  -20  20  100  -16  na  -2  na  20 
1996  20  -32  40  2  68  14  11  na  31  -45  na  -41  22  125  -5  na  23  na  26 
1997  -4  -35  62  6  63  25  -26  na  33  -52  na  -56  0  113  -22  na  -4  na  5 
1998  24  52  112  8  147  49  54  na  101  -36  na  19  -15  127  -20  na  16  na  57 
1999  16  -3  87  18  75  56  27  na  56  -19  na  -40  -9  181  -22  na  26  na  33 
2000  14  -16  17  23  79  102  4  na  45  -4  na  -46  -4  141  -2  na  48  na  33 
2001  36  84  74  68  94  124  54  na  130  -4  na  -3  28  90  -16  na  54  na  71 
2002  16  93  46  7  88  13  64  na  192  3  na  -11  19  173  -23  na  18  na  49 
2003  73  37  22  75  126  124  11  na  146  4  na  -20  -7  228  -29  na  61  na  61 
2004  60  7  101  79  143  68  40  na  167  -2  na  -25  -2  293  -5  na  36  na  70 
2005  27  60  163  26  49  55  109  na  56  7  na  -75  -9  294  -5  na  16  na  47 
2006  14  43  120  4  66  41  99  na  88  1  na  -73  -12  157  -4  na  -10  na  37 
2007  0  66  0  21  0  0  18  10  100  0  1  68  0  99  0  0  0  1  11 




Appendix Table 15 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Romania, 1992 to 2007 
(b) Nominal and relative rates of assistance to all
a agricultural products, to exportable
b and import-competing
 b agricultural industries, and 
relative
c to non-agricultural industries          (percent) 
  
  
Total ag NRA  Ag tradables NRA 
Non-ag 
tradables 
NRA  RRA 









competing  All  Inputs  Outputs 
1992  6  9  10  11  7  11  12  11  1 
1993  6  29  34  33  9  46  36  11  22 
1994  12  26  30  30  4  41  32  11  19 
1995  7  13  14  16  2  30  16  11  5 
1996  10  16  18  18  7  31  20  11  8 
1997  2  2  4  5  -4  22  6  11  -5 
1998  2  55  56  58  6  90  59  11  43 
1999  2  30  33  34  10  50  35  8  26 
2000  4  30  33  34  10  38  36  8  26 
2001  4  66  69  68  5  74  70  8  57 
2002  1  48  50  50  5  85  51  8  40 
2003  3  58  62  61  -26  70  63  8  51 
2004  6  63  68  69  56  71  44  3  40 
2005  0  47  57  45  13  68  21  3  17 
2006  0  37  44  15  -21  46  14  3  11 
2007  0  11  13  8  7  14  9  3  6 
 
 
a. NRAs including assistance to nontradables and non-product specific assistance.
 
b. NRAs including products specific input subsidies.  





t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural 




Appendix Table 15 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Romania, 1992 to 2007 
(c) Value shares of primary production of covered
























1992  2  6  4  10  8  1  18  Na  6  0  na  3  0  0  2  na  4  na  36 
1993  2  6  3  11  7  1  12  na  4  0  na  3  0  0  2  na  7  na  41 
1994  2  7  3  12  8  1  10  na  3  0  na  3  0  0  2  na  6  na  43 
1995  2  5  3  12  8  0  10  na  3  0  na  2  0  0  2  na  9  na  42 
1996  2  5  4  16  9  0  11  na  4  0  na  2  0  0  3  na  4  na  40 
1997  2  5  3  15  8  0  14  na  3  0  na  2  0  0  2  na  9  na  37 
1998  1  4  4  12  10  0  12  na  4  0  na  2  1  0  4  na  7  na  39 
1999  1  4  3  14  10  0  8  na  4  0  na  2  0  0  4  na  5  na  44 
2000  1  4  4  8  13  0  9  na  3  0  na  3  0  0  2  na  7  na  45 
2001  2  3  4  14  13  0  10  na  3  0  na  2  0  0  3  na  11  na  34 
2002  2  3  4  14  12  1  8  na  3  0  na  2  0  0  4  na  6  na  41 
2003  1  3  5  14  10  0  8  na  3  0  na  3  1  0  5  na  4  na  44 
2004  1  4  4  15  8  0  7  na  2  0  na  3  1  0  4  na  9  na  43 
2005  1  4  3  8  7  0  6  na  2  0  na  2  1  0  3  na  6  na  58 
2006  1  3  3  9  9  0  5  na  1  0  na  2  1  0  3  na  6  na  58 
2007  2  2  5  7  13  1  6  8  2  2  0  2  1  0  3  5  9  9  24 










y    Beef   Egg   Maize   Milk   Oat  
Pigme












o   Wheat   Wine  
1992  M  X  X  M  M  M  X  na  M  X  na  M  M  M  M  na  M  na 
1993  M  X  X  M  M  M  X  na  M  X  na  M  M  M  X  na  M  na 
1994  M  X  M  M  M  X  X  na  M  X  na  M  M  M  X  na  M  na 
1995  M  M  M  X  M  X  X  na  M  X  na  M  M  M  X  na  X  na 
1996  X  M  M  X  M  X  X  na  M  X  na  M  M  M  X  na  X  na 
1997  X  M  X  X  M  M  X  na  M  X  na  M  M  M  X  na  X  na 
1998  M  M  M  X  M  M  M  na  M  X  na  X  X  M  X  na  X  na 
1999  M  M  M  X  M  M  M  na  M  X  na  X  X  M  X  na  X  na 
2000  M  M  M  X  M  M  M  na  M  X  na  X  X  M  X  na  M  na 
2001  X  M  M  M  M  M  M  na  M  X  na  X  M  M  X  na  M  na 
2002  X  M  M  X  M  M  M  na  M  X  na  X  M  M  X  na  X  na 
2003  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  na  M  X  na  X  M  M  X  na  M  na 
2004  M  M  M  X  M  M  M  na  M  X  na  X  M  M  X  na  M  na 
2005  M  M  M  X  M  M  M  na  M  X  na  X  M  M  X  na  M  na 
2006  X  M  M  M  M  M  M  na  M  X  na  X  M  M  X  na  M  na 
2007  X  M  M  M  M  M  M  X  M  X  X  X  M  M  X  X  M  X 
 
Sources: Ciaian and Swinnen (2007) and OECD (2007) 
a. Exportable (X), import-competing (M) and nontradables (H). 





Appendix Table 16: Annual distortion estimates, Russia, 1992 to 2005 
(a) Nominal rates of assistance








y   Rye   Sugar  
Sunfl




1992  6  -73  -64  -34  -55  -32  -70  -57  -25  16  -40  -46  -34 
1993  -14  -50  -38  -3  -29  -28  -11  -9  -29  96  -51  -20  -8 
1994  -12  -42  10  95  -3  -12  20  27  1  65  -17  -11  22 
1995  -37  -30  50  47  63  -16  32  49  25  63  -6  -11  35 
1996  -2  -8  31  62  63  28  27  55  38  93  -22  5  36 
1997  0  51  46  43  79  16  46  71  27  105  -26  7  45 
1998  -10  0  29  12  52  -5  46  31  -12  88  -30  -21  26 
1999  -41  -19  6  -14  24  -33  39  12  -23  7  -33  -28  3 
2000  -16  18  -17  9  11  -7  3  51  30  22  -34  -21  4 
2001  -17  48  -1  35  9  -38  46  110  -8  42  2  -10  18 
2002  -25  72  -8  -19  40  -66  59  73  -44  71  -22  -21  24 
2003  -22  47  -32  -14  43  -57  31  46  -41  85  -22  -8  17 
2004  -12  20  5  -24  40  -29  42  79  11  98  9  3  26 
2005  -11  9  0  -34  3  -25  61  100  -11  59  na  -10  11 




Appendix Table 16 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Russia, 1992 to 2005 
(b) Nominal and relative rates of assistance to all
a agricultural products, to exportable
b and import-competing
 b agricultural industries, and 
relative
c to non-agricultural industries          (percent) 
  
  
Total ag NRA  Ag tradables NRA 
Non-ag 
tradables 
NRA  RRA 









competing  All  Inputs  Outputs 
1992  14  -49  -48  -45  -50  -48  -45  2  -46 
1993  19  -27  -27  -20  -26  -27  -20  8  -25 
1994  31  -8  -8  9  -11  -7  9  9  -1 
1995  21  14  14  24  -24  19  24  9  14 
1996  13  23  23  29  -22  25  29  10  17 
1997  7  38  38  42  -6  44  42  12  27 
1998  6  19  19  26  -30  22  26  12  13 
1999  6  -3  -3  1  -10  -2  1  12  -10 
2000  4  0  0  3  -22  2  3  12  -7 
2001  5  12  13  17  -14  27  17  9  7 
2002  7  16  16  19  -29  43  19  9  9 
2003  6  11  11  14  -16  23  14  9  4 
2004  4  22  22  25  0  32  14  9  5 
2005  0  11  17  13  -8  21  6  9  -3 
 
 
a. NRAs including assistance to nontradables and non-product specific assistance.
 
b. NRAs including products specific input subsidies.  





t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural 




Appendix Table 16 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Russia, 1992 to 2004 
(c) Value shares of primary production of covered








y   Rye   Sugar  
Sunfl




1992  7  12  5  1  13  4  9  3  4  1  2  16  23 
1993  5  15  6  1  14  3  7  4  3  1  2  12  28 
1994  5  15  6  0  14  3  6  3  1  1  2  8  37 
1995  4  14  4  0  14  2  6  3  1  1  3  9  38 
1996  5  12  5  0  14  2  6  2  2  1  2  12  37 
1997  6  8  5  1  14  2  7  3  2  1  2  15  35 
1998  2  11  6  0  16  1  6  3  1  1  2  9  41 
1999  3  9  5  0  16  1  5  3  1  1  3  11  41 
2000  4  6  6  1  17  1  6  2  1  1  2  13  39 
2001  5  7  6  0  17  3  7  2  2  1  1  14  35 
2002  4  6  6  1  15  3  6  3  2  1  3  12  38 
2003  5  6  8  1  15  2  6  3  1  1  3  10  40 
2004  5  8  6  1  15  2  6  3  1  1  3  13  36 















y   Rye   Sugar  
Sunfl
ower   Wheat  
1992  M  M  X  M  M  X  M  M  M  M  M  M 
1993  X  M  M  M  M  X  M  M  X  M  X  M 
1994  X  M  M  M  M  X  M  M  X  M  X  M 
1995  X  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  X  M 
1996  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  X  M 
1997  X  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  X  M 
1998  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  X  M 
1999  M  M  X  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  X  M 
2000  X  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  X  M 
2001  X  M  M  M  M  X  M  M  M  M  X  X 
2002  X  M  M  M  M  X  M  M  X  M  X  X 
2003  X  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  X  M  X  X 
2004  X  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  X  X 
2005  X  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  na  X 
Sources: Liefert and Liefert (2007) and OECD (2007) 
a. Exportable (X), import-competing (M) and nontradables (H). 





Appendix Table 17: Annual distortion estimates, Slovakia, 1992 to 2007 
(a) Nominal rates of assistance




y   Beef   Egg   Maize   Milk   Oat  
Pigme




eed   Rye  
Soybe








1992  5  72  35  42  48  -19  -1  na  59  17  14  na  72  11  na  5  na  45 
1993  57  12  28  32  70  -3  15  na  62  -4  11  na  44  -7  na  24  na  45 
1994  41  14  27  13  48  5  23  na  50  -27  32  na  24  -21  na  17  na  35 
1995  -5  15  37  9  34  6  20  na  53  -5  29  na  19  -1  na  -18  na  22 
1996  -20  6  17  -5  31  2  10  na  48  -12  1  na  25  -1  na  -25  na  13 
1997  3  4  36  6  57  63  14  na  42  -12  21  na  36  2  na  -7  na  28 
1998  47  0  50  -4  95  45  50  na  58  -17  62  na  53  -14  na  18  na  52 
1999  4  3  46  -11  67  35  71  na  34  3  50  na  43  -6  na  7  na  45 
2000  -3  9  42  3  45  47  44  na  47  12  60  na  55  24  na  11  na  50 
2001  -8  9  23  -9  35  23  36  na  44  -7  22  na  26  -15  na  -4  na  30 
2002  22  2  20  -18  69  -5  45  na  57  -11  -11  na  24  -14  na  -2  na  37 
2003  -1  17  13  -1  79  10  41  na  59  -9  16  na  52  4  na  0  na  44 
2004  0  -125  0  -25  87  1  36  na  103  0  na  na  193  0  na  0  na  22 
2005  0  109  0  19  33  24  19  10  69  0  na  0  168  0  0  0  2  21 
2006  0  81  0  11  25  0  14  10  69  0  na  0  62  0  0  0  1  15 
2007  0  66  0  21  0  0  18  10  100  0  na  0  99  0  0  0  1  10 




Appendix Table 17 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Slovakia, 1992 to 2007 
(b) Nominal and relative rates of assistance to all
a agricultural products, to exportable
b and import-competing
 b agricultural industries, and 
relative
c to non-agricultural industries          (percent) 
  
  
Total ag NRA  Ag tradables NRA 
Non-ag 
tradables 
NRA  RRA 









competing  All  Inputs  Outputs 
1992  21  24  24  30  24  25  30  na  na 
1993  14  31  31  35  41  23  35  na  na 
1994  10  25  25  30  30  21  30  na  na 
1995  9  13  13  17  7  20  17  na  na 
1996  9  4  4  7  -3  14  7  na  na 
1997  12  16  16  19  15  17  19  na  na 
1998  15  38  38  43  36  40  43  na  na 
1999  14  31  31  36  21  43  36  na  na 
2000  19  31  31  35  28  32  35  na  na 
2001  13  17  17  20  12  20  20  na  na 
2002  13  24  24  30  18  34  30  21  7 
2003  14  30  30  35  30  29  35  21  11 
2004  0  22  30  17  44  8  21  5  15 
2005  0  21  28  22  16  26  18  5  12 
2006  0  15  20  18  11  19  12  5  7 
2007  0  10  14  13  5  16  8  5  3 
 
 
a. NRAs including assistance to nontradables and non-product specific assistance.
 
b. NRAs including products specific input subsidies.  





t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural 




Appendix Table 17 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Slovakia, 1992 to 2007 
(c) Value shares of primary production of covered




y   Beef   Egg   Maize  Milk   Oat  
Pigme




eed  Rye  
Soybe








1992  6  7  5  4  12  0  23  na  3  1  0  na  2  1  na  12  na  24 
1993  5  10  5  5  12  0  21  na  3  1  1  na  2  1  na  12  na  22 
1994  5  8  5  4  12  0  19  na  3  2  1  na  2  1  na  15  na  25 
1995  5  7  4  4  12  0  18  na  3  2  0  na  2  1  na  15  na  27 
1996  5  6  4  6  10  0  17  na  3  2  0  na  2  1  na  14  na  28 
1997  6  7  4  5  10  0  19  na  4  3  1  na  2  1  na  14  na  24 
1998  5  9  4  5  10  0  17  na  5  2  1  na  2  2  na  13  na  24 
1999  6  8  3  7  13  0  14  na  6  4  0  na  2  2  na  9  na  25 
2000  4  7  4  4  16  0  17  na  6  2  0  na  2  2  na  10  na  26 
2001  5  4  4  5  14  0  15  na  6  4  1  na  2  2  na  14  na  23 
2002  6  5  4  7  13  0  14  na  5  5  1  na  2  3  na  12  na  23 
2003  8  5  5  5  13  0  14  na  5  1  0  na  2  5  na  8  na  28 
2004  5  5  4  5  13  0  13  na  5  3  na  na  2  3  na  20  na  24 
2005  6  4  3  7  10  0  11  2  4  4  na  0  1  4  2  13  4  24 
2006  6  4  5  7  9  0  10  3  4  5  na  0  2  4  2  13  3  24 
2007  9  3  5  5  7  0  8  3  3  7  na  0  0  3  1  19  3  24 









   barley  beef  egg  maize  milk  oat 
pigme




ed  rye 
soybe




o  wheat  wine 
1992  X  M  M  X  X  X  M  na  M  X  M  na  M  X  na  X  na 
1993  X  X  M  X  X  X  M  na  M  M  M  na  M  X  na  M  na 
1994  X  X  X  X  X  M  M  na  M  M  M  na  M  X  na  M  na 
1995  X  M  X  X  X  M  M  na  M  M  M  na  M  X  na  X  na 
1996  X  M  X  X  X  X  M  na  M  X  M  na  M  X  na  X  na 
1997  X  M  X  X  X  X  M  na  M  X  M  na  M  X  na  X  na 
1998  X  M  M  X  X  M  M  na  M  X  M  na  M  X  na  X  na 
1999  X  M  M  X  X  X  M  na  M  X  M  na  M  X  na  X  na 
2000  X  M  M  X  X  X  M  na  M  X  M  na  M  X  na  M  na 
2001  X  M  M  X  X  M  M  na  M  X  M  na  M  X  na  M  na 
2002  X  M  M  X  X  M  M  na  M  X  X  na  M  X  na  X  na 
2003  X  M  X  X  X  X  M  na  M  M  X  na  M  X  na  M  na 
2004  X  M  M  X  X  X  M  na  M  X  na  na  X  X  na  M  na 
2005  X  M  M  X  X  X  M  X  M  X  na  X  X  X  X  M  X 
2006  X  M  M  X  X  X  M  X  M  X  na  X  X  X  X  M  X 
2007  X  M  M  X  X  X  M  X  M  X  na  X  X  X  X  M  X 
Sources: Ciaian and Swinnen (2007) and OECD (2007) 
a. Exportable (X), import-competing (M) and nontradables (H). 




Appendix Table 18: Annual distortion estimates, Slovenia, 1992 to 2007 
(a) Nominal rates of assistance














1992  81  62  47  54  101  23  110  193  126  91  64 
1993  116  34  23  41  102  42  93  105  136  91  57 
1994  85  41  25  23  108  41  95  98  84  82  58 
1995  31  68  60  11  91  38  110  243  75  49  62 
1996  31  62  42  11  77  19  87  138  76  38  48 
1997  56  97  41  -4  102  25  71  117  79  44  59 
1998  75  112  66  4  169  56  74  151  111  94  89 
1999  58  115  65  13  142  82  91  122  156  107  98 
2000  62  110  27  32  85  42  69  80  83  95  69 
2001  93  144  10  24  79  33  61  83  74  72  65 
2002  107  152  29  3  108  33  74  72  87  81  73 
2003  79  147  0  48  117  38  82  81  139  77  82 
2004  0  -125  0  -25  87  36  103  47  193  na  29 
2005  0  109  0  19  33  19  69  54  168  0  40 
2006  0  81  0  11  25  14  69  74  62  0  32 
2007  0  66  0  21  0  18  100  68  99  0  29 




Appendix Table 18 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Slovenia, 1992 to 2007 
(b) Nominal and relative rates of assistance to all
a agricultural products, to exportable
b and import-competing
 b agricultural industries, and 
relative
c to non-agricultural industries          (percent) 
  
  
Total ag NRA  Ag tradables NRA 
Non-ag 
tradables 
NRA  RRA 









competing  All  Inputs  Outputs 
1992  9  55  64  68  83  37  68  na  na 
1993  6  51  57  60  61  51  60  na  na 
1994  4  54  58  61  90  42  61  na  na 
1995  5  57  62  66  92  46  66  na  na 
1996  6  42  48  51  74  35  51  na  na 
1997  7  51  59  63  87  23  63  na  na 
1998  9  80  89  95  124  53  95  na  na 
1999  12  86  98  106  122  66  106  11  84 
2000  16  53  69  76  81  61  76  11  58 
2001  19  46  65  71  91  35  71  10  56 
2002  22  51  73  80  111  33  80  1  77 
2003  25  58  82  92  105  47  92  2  89 
2004  0  29  29  22  37  20  27  4  22 
2005  0  40  40  37  60  17  38  4  33 
2006  0  32  32  31  50  11  31  4  26 
2007  0  29  29  27  40  15  27  4  22 
 
 
a. NRAs including assistance to nontradables and non-product specific assistance.
 
b. NRAs including products specific input subsidies.  





t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural 




Appendix Table 18 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Slovenia, 1992 to 2007 
(c) Value shares of primary production of covered














1992  0  13  4  3  11  19  9  0  0  3  38 
1993  0  17  4  5  10  15  6  0  0  3  40 
1994  1  14  3  6  10  13  5  0  1  3  44 
1995  1  13  3  6  12  15  5  0  1  3  41 
1996  1  11  3  6  11  15  5  0  1  3  44 
1997  1  11  3  6  10  14  7  0  1  3  44 
1998  1  11  3  7  11  14  8  0  1  3  42 
1999  1  12  3  7  15  12  7  0  1  2  41 
2000  1  9  4  5  17  13  7  0  1  3  41 
2001  1  8  4  4  17  17  7  1  0  3  39 
2002  1  7  3  7  16  13  6  1  0  2  44 
2003  1  9  4  4  16  15  8  1  0  2  41 
2004  1  11  5  7  22  19  9  1  1  na  24 
2005  1  10  5  7  21  19  9  1  1  3  24 
2006  1  10  5  7  21  19  9  1  1  3  24 
2007  1  10  5  7  21  19  9  1  1  3  24 

















meat   Sugar   Wheat  
1992  M  X  X  M  X  M  X  M  M  M 
1993  M  X  X  M  X  M  X  M  M  M 
1994  M  M  X  M  X  M  X  M  M  M 
1995  M  M  X  M  X  M  X  M  M  M 
1996  M  M  X  M  X  M  X  M  M  M 
1997  M  X  X  M  X  M  X  M  M  M 
1998  M  X  M  M  X  M  X  M  M  M 
1999  M  X  M  M  X  M  X  M  M  M 
2000  M  M  M  M  X  M  X  M  M  M 
2001  M  X  M  M  X  M  X  M  M  M 
2002  M  X  M  M  X  M  X  M  M  M 
2003  M  X  X  M  X  M  X  M  M  M 
2004  M  X  M  M  X  M  X  X  M  na 
2005  M  X  M  M  X  M  X  X  M  M 
2006  M  X  M  M  X  M  X  X  M  M 
2007  M  X  M  M  X  M  X  X  M  M 
Sources: Ciaian and Swinnen (2007) and OECD (2007) 
a. Exportable (X), import-competing (M) and nontradables (H). 





Appendix Table 19: Annual distortion estimates, Turkey, 1961 to 2007 
(a) Nominal rates of assistance






y  Beef 
Cotto










ry  Rice 
Shee
pmea












1961  na  -12  na  -34  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  -62  na  -20  -26 
1962  na  na  na  -25  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  -37  na  -7  -13 
1963  na  -4  na  -22  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  -33  na  -7  -12 
1964  na  -28  na  -23  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  -52  na  -10  -24 
1965  na  na  na  -20  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  -51  na  -1  -13 
1966  na  na  na  -17  na  -10  na  na  36  27  na  na  na  na  1  -44  -48  4  1 
1967  -15  -44  na  -20  na  -20  na  na  61  7  na  na  na  na  -4  -44  14  -46  -23 
1968  -34  na  na  -28  na  -15  na  na  70  -10  na  na  na  na  -14  -46  na  -64  -35 
1969  -34  na  na  -18  na  0  na  -33  -14  6  na  na  na  na  -7  -52  -84  13  -18 
1970  -29  na  na  -6  na  22  na  na  61  -5  na  na  na  na  -5  -38  -76  32  10 
1971  -42  -5  na  -28  na  -8  na  -13  22  -25  na  na  na  na  -24  -44  na  -9  -10 
1972  -44  23  na  -14  na  -9  na  na  59  11  na  na  na  na  1  -47  -74  -8  -8 
1973  -41  na  na  1  na  2  na  na  57  11  na  na  na  na  -27  -31  -27  -56  -20 
1974  -45  na  na  -10  na  6  na  na  37  22  na  na  na  na  -44  -31  13  -22  -7 
1975  -52  na  na  24  na  -17  na  na  69  20  na  na  na  na  9  -32  -34  -24  -7 
1976  -53  -10  na  24  na  -13  3  na  181  -8  na  na  na  na  -4  -32  -61  2  3 
1977  -54  -22  na  -10  na  -4  -20  na  47  -18  na  na  na  na  -23  -33  -67  1  -13 
1978  -54  -18  na  -52  na  3  -40  na  41  32  na  na  na  na  -48  -51  -20  na  -13 
1979  -49  -36  na  -23  na  -2  -32  na  26  33  na  na  na  na  -70  -44  -2  na  -11 
1980  -55  -39  na  -39  na  -2  -45  na  13  3  na  na  na  na  -59  -67  -35  na  -24 
1981  -60  -37  na  -32  -18  -14  -55  na  -13  -29  na  na  na  na  -58  -64  -34  -18  -27 
1982  -53  -45  na  -26  -31  -9  -44  -18  43  -15  na  na  na  na  -62  -68  -47  -27  -26 
1983  -48  -42  na  -27  -24  -10  -85  -93  -27  -6  na  na  na  na  -64  -73  -41  -28  -49 
1984  -43  -22  na  na  -20  -19  -55  -23  18  13  na  na  na  na  -60  na  -25  -31  -21 
1985  -20  -24  na  na  -8  -7  -30  -25  62  31  na  10  na  na  -17  na  7  -14  1 




1987  -2  71  27  -49  17  -5  -68  24  64  40  42  -56  22  24  31  16  35  53  4 
1988  3  -3  -7  -61  18  -10  -54  22  24  14  26  na  3  5  -4  -21  46  78  -5 
1989  -30  18  8  -55  53  44  -36  27  43  38  36  175  22  -3  32  -10  63  62  10 
1990  -13  55  54  -56  30  12  -31  52  154  60  57  324  25  24  36  7  20  33  17 
1991  -26  63  128  -60  6  -2  -37  68  126  4  43  258  20  50  49  57  26  89  25 
1992  -4  55  68  -53  72  31  -40  63  129  37  63  242  10  66  51  19  10  35  23 
1993  -16  92  61  -25  34  16  -52  40  128  26  83  248  24  55  41  29  9  25  26 
1994  -23  32  14  -43  20  35  -40  3  89  10  40  157  29  -13  10  75  -18  43  8 
1995  12  9  62  -58  101  -6  -40  23  90  47  82  133  39  52  34  61  -31  4  4 
1996  10  32  50  -58  51  -15  -26  34  102  75  43  144  8  56  68  82  14  21  14 
1997  0  43  113  -57  53  12  -45  58  136  -2  26  108  8  119  66  58  4  46  19 
1998  8  138  198  -32  84  33  -25  94  198  25  95  114  52  146  62  46  -13  87  43 
1999  1  91  179  -42  78  0  -21  64  111  14  63  54  49  191  40  -4  -36  77  25 
2000  3  37  145  -39  79  26  -12  46  78  32  56  100  33  125  37  -20  -1  30  23 
2001  -19  5  80  -20  32  -8  -21  7  11  46  19  69  -15  41  27  -31  -16  -4  1 
2002  -1  6  118  -22  36  30  7  18  56  174  47  123  9  93  7  -16  -19  15  19 
2003  -1  29  195  -42  19  30  9  61  86  145  53  99  21  155  14  6  5  64  33 
2004  16  37  125  -57  87  67  na  69  53  194  75  na  7  167  12  2  -20  24  24 
2005  92  51  102  -45  121  44  na  68  29  315  66  na  14  136  23  16  -31  39  26 
2006  89  30  92  -18  64  49  na  93  45  211  48  na  34  30  49  20  -40  33  35 
2007  103  -10  79  2  79  60  na  54  4  126  50  na  44  120  31  -9  -30  44  27 




Appendix Table 19 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Turkey, 1961 to 2007 
(b) Nominal and relative rates of assistance to all
a agricultural products, to exportable
b 
and import-competing
 b agricultural industries, and relative
c to non-agricultural 
industries          (percent) 
  
Total ag NRA  Ag tradables NRA 
Non-ag 
tradables 
NRA  RRA 









competing  All  Inputs  Outputs 
1961  0  -26  -26  -26  -34  -20  -26  100  -63 
1962  0  -13  -13  -13  -29  -7  -13  24  -30 
1963  0  -12  -12  -12  -19  -7  -12  33  -34 
1964  0  -24  -24  -24  -37  -10  -24  86  -59 
1965  0  -13  -13  -13  -35  -1  -13  101  -57 
1966  0  1  1  1  -20  17  1  123  -55 
1967  0  -23  -23  -23  -26  -21  -23  267  -79 
1968  0  -35  -35  -35  -25  -40  -35  100  -68 
1969  0  -18  -18  -18  -36  -4  -18  113  -62 
1970  0  10  10  12  -21  43  12  75  -36 
1971  0  -10  -10  -8  -22  2  -8  69  -46 
1972  0  -8  -8  -6  -27  16  -6  41  -33 
1973  0  -20  -20  -18  -10  -26  -18  39  -41 
1974  0  -7  -7  -5  -9  -5  -5  24  -23 
1975  0  -7  -7  -6  -17  1  -6  17  -20 
1976  0  3  3  4  -22  40  4  20  -14 
1977  0  -13  -13  -12  -31  17  -12  25  -30 
1978  0  -13  -13  -12  -26  32  -12  94  -55 
1979  0  -11  -11  -10  -19  9  -10  122  -60 
1980  0  -24  -24  -23  -33  1  -23  52  -50 
1981  0  -27  -27  -27  -35  -18  -27  42  -49 
1982  0  -26  -26  -26  -38  -12  -26  24  -40 
1983  0  -49  -49  -49  -49  -50  -49  23  -59 
1984  0  -21  -21  -13  -23  -19  -13  23  -29 
1985  0  1  1  11  -5  8  11  23  -10 
1986  6  3  9  14  -4  31  14  23  -8 
1987  6  -2  4  10  -9  34  10  21  -9 
1988  6  -11  -5  1  -20  30  1  19  -15 
1989  6  4  10  17  -4  40  17  16  0 
1990  5  12  17  22  1  54  22  14  7 
1991  5  19  25  31  -2  95  31  12  17 
1992  6  17  23  30  4  64  30  10  18 
1993  6  20  26  32  13  53  32  8  22 
1994  7  1  8  15  -3  35  15  6  9 
1995  7  -3  4  11  -10  39  11  4  6 
1996  7  8  14  21  -1  46  21  2  18 
1997  7  12  19  27  -7  81  27  2  24 
1998  7  37  43  49  12  128  49  1  48 
1999  6  19  25  32  -3  109  32  1  30 
2000  3  20  23  26  5  67  26  1  25 
2001  1  0  1  2  -8  17  2  1  1 
2002  0  19  19  20  6  43  20  1  19 
2003  0  33  33  34  8  90  34  1  33 
2004  0  24  24  24  5  53  15  1  14 
2005  0  26  26  31  11  50  18  0  17 
2006  0  35  32  22  26  60  28  0  28 
2007  0  27  25  18  29  25  25  0  24 
a. NRAs including assistance to nontradables and non-product specific assistance.
 









t are the percentage NRAs for 




Appendix Table 19 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Turkey, 1961 to 2007 
(c) Value shares of primary production of covered
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1961  na  15  na  15  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  11  na  58  0 
1962  na  na  na  17  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  11  na  72  0 
1963  na  16  na  12  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  15  na  57  0 
1964  na  16  na  14  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  23  na  47  0 
1965  na  na  na  18  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  17  na  64  0 
1966  na  na  na  6  na  10  na  na  14  2  na  na  na  na  1  6  3  21  37 
1967  2  7  na  4  na  7  na  na  9  2  na  na  na  na  1  5  1  28  34 
1968  2  na  na  5  na  7  na  na  7  3  na  na  na  na  1  3  na  34  38 
1969  2  na  na  4  na  7  na  2  18  3  na  na  na  na  1  4  8  15  36 
1970  3  na  na  5  na  8  na  na  13  4  na  na  na  na  2  4  7  16  37 
1971  3  5  na  7  na  8  na  2  13  4  na  na  na  na  2  4  na  20  34 
1972  3  3  na  7  na  7  na  na  10  3  na  na  na  na  2  4  8  17  36 
1973  3  na  na  5  na  7  na  na  9  3  na  na  na  na  2  2  3  26  41 
1974  3  na  na  9  na  7  na  na  10  2  na  na  na  na  1  4  2  22  39 
1975  3  na  na  4  na  7  na  na  9  2  na  na  na  na  1  5  3  27  38 
1976  3  5  na  4  na  7  1  na  6  4  na  na  na  na  1  8  5  19  36 
1977  3  4  na  5  na  7  2  na  9  3  na  na  na  na  1  5  10  14  38 
1978  5  4  na  7  na  9  2  na  12  3  na  na  na  na  1  7  7  na  43 
1979  5  6  na  5  na  8  3  na  13  3  na  na  na  na  3  4  4  na  47 
1980  4  5  na  5  na  10  3  na  13  3  na  na  na  na  3  6  6  na  43 
1981  3  5  na  4  2  7  3  na  12  3  na  na  na  na  2  2  4  15  37 
1982  3  6  na  4  2  6  2  1  6  2  na  na  na  na  2  5  4  17  40 
1983  2  3  na  3  1  4  7  9  8  2  na  na  na  na  2  4  3  10  43 
1984  3  5  na  na  2  6  2  1  8  3  na  na  na  na  2  na  5  16  47 
1985  2  5  na  na  2  6  1  2  8  3  na  1  na  na  2  na  5  14  49 
1986  2  2  2  7  1  4  na  1  2  3  1  1  3  1  1  2  4  9  54 
1987  1  2  3  8  1  5  5  1  2  2  1  1  3  1  1  3  3  5  52 
1988  2  3  3  9  1  4  4  1  3  2  1  na  3  1  1  4  3  5  51 
1989  2  2  3  10  1  4  4  1  4  2  1  0  3  2  1  5  3  6  45 
1990  2  2  2  9  1  5  2  1  2  3  1  0  3  2  1  4  6  8  48 
1991  3  2  2  9  1  6  2  1  3  3  1  0  3  2  1  3  5  6  47 
1992  2  2  3  7  1  5  3  1  3  2  1  0  4  2  1  5  5  7  45 
1993  2  2  4  4  1  5  2  1  3  3  1  0  3  2  1  4  7  8  46 
1994  3  2  4  7  2  5  5  1  3  2  2  0  3  2  1  2  7  5  46 
1995  2  2  3  11  1  4  3  1  3  3  1  0  2  1  1  2  5  6  50 
1996  2  3  3  9  1  5  3  1  3  1  2  0  3  2  1  2  6  9  45 
1997  2  3  2  10  2  3  4  1  3  3  2  0  3  2  1  3  5  8  42 
1998  3  2  2  8  1  4  5  1  2  4  2  0  2  2  1  2  8  7  44 
1999  3  2  2  7  1  5  4  1  3  4  2  0  2  1  1  3  9  5  45 
2000  3  2  2  8  1  4  3  1  4  3  2  0  2  2  1  2  7  7  45 
2001  3  3  2  6  1  4  3  1  5  2  2  0  2  1  1  1  6  8  46 
2002  3  3  2  7  1  4  2  1  4  1  2  0  2  2  1  2  7  8  47 
2003  3  3  2  8  2  4  2  1  4  1  2  0  2  1  1  1  9  7  46 
2004  2  3  3  9  1  4  na  1  7  1  2  na  2  1  1  1  9  9  44 
2005  2  3  4  7  1  4  na  1  7  1  3  na  2  1  1  1  11  8  43 
2006  2  4  4  4  1  6  na  1  9  1  4  na  3  2  1  1  7  8  42 
2007  2  4  3  4  1  3  na  1  11  2  4  na  3  1  1  1  9  8  42 
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1961  na  X  na  X  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  X  na  M 
1962  na  na  na  X  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  X  na  M 
1963  na  X  na  X  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  X  na  M 
1964  na  X  na  X  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  X  na  M 
1965  na  na  na  X  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  X  na  M 
1966  na  na  na  X  na  X  na  na  M  X  na  na  na  na  M  X  X  M 
1967  X  X  na  X  na  X  na  na  M  X  na  na  na  na  M  X  X  M 
1968  X  na  na  X  na  X  na  na  M  X  na  na  na  na  M  X  na  M 
1969  X  na  na  X  na  X  na  M  M  X  na  na  na  na  M  X  X  M 
1970  X  na  na  X  na  X  na  na  M  X  na  na  na  na  M  X  X  M 
1971  X  X  na  X  na  X  na  M  M  X  na  na  na  na  M  X  na  M 
1972  X  X  na  X  na  X  na  na  M  X  na  na  na  na  M  X  X  M 
1973  X  na  na  X  na  X  na  na  M  X  na  na  na  na  M  X  X  M 
1974  X  na  na  X  na  X  na  na  M  X  na  na  na  na  M  X  X  M 
1975  X  na  na  X  na  X  na  na  M  X  na  na  na  na  M  X  X  M 
1976  X  X  na  X  na  X  X  na  M  X  na  na  na  na  M  X  X  M 
1977  X  X  na  X  na  X  X  na  M  X  na  na  na  na  M  X  X  M 
1978  X  X  na  X  na  X  X  na  M  X  na  na  na  na  M  X  X  na 
1979  X  X  na  X  na  X  X  na  M  X  na  na  na  na  M  X  X  na 
1980  X  X  na  X  na  X  X  na  M  X  na  na  na  na  M  X  X  na 
1981  X  X  na  X  X  X  X  na  M  X  na  na  na  na  M  X  X  M 
1982  X  X  na  X  X  X  X  M  M  X  na  na  na  na  M  X  X  M 
1983  X  X  na  X  X  X  X  M  M  X  na  na  na  na  M  X  X  M 
1984  X  X  na  na  X  X  X  M  M  X  na  na  na  na  M  na  X  M 
1985  X  X  na  na  X  X  X  M  M  X  na  M  na  na  M  na  X  M 
1986  X  X  M  X  X  X  na  M  M  X  X  M  X  M  M  X  X  M 
1987  X  X  M  X  X  X  X  M  M  X  X  M  X  M  M  X  X  M 
1988  X  X  M  X  X  X  X  M  M  X  X  na  X  M  M  X  X  M 
1989  X  X  M  X  X  X  X  M  M  X  X  M  X  M  M  X  X  M 
1990  X  X  M  X  X  X  X  M  M  X  X  M  X  M  M  X  X  M 
1991  X  X  M  X  X  X  X  M  M  X  X  M  X  M  M  X  X  M 
1992  X  X  M  X  X  X  X  M  M  X  X  M  X  M  M  X  X  M 
1993  X  X  M  X  X  X  X  M  M  X  X  M  X  M  M  X  X  M 
1994  X  X  M  X  X  X  X  M  M  X  X  M  X  M  M  X  X  M 
1995  X  X  M  X  X  X  X  M  M  X  X  M  X  M  M  X  X  M 
1996  X  X  M  X  X  X  X  M  M  X  X  M  X  M  M  X  X  M 
1997  X  X  M  X  X  X  X  M  M  X  X  M  X  M  M  X  X  M 
1998  X  X  M  X  X  X  X  M  M  X  X  M  X  M  M  X  X  M 
1999  X  X  M  X  X  X  X  M  M  X  X  M  X  M  M  X  X  M 
2000  X  X  M  X  X  X  X  M  M  X  X  M  X  M  M  X  X  M 
2001  X  X  M  X  X  X  X  M  M  X  X  M  X  M  M  X  X  M 
2002  X  X  M  X  X  X  X  M  M  X  X  M  X  M  M  X  X  M 
2003  X  X  M  X  X  X  X  M  M  X  X  M  X  M  M  X  X  M 
2004  X  X  M  X  X  X  na  M  M  X  X  na  X  M  M  X  X  M 
2005  X  X  M  X  X  X  na  M  M  X  X  na  X  M  M  X  X  M 
2006  X  X  M  X  X  X  na  M  M  X  X  na  X  X  M  X  X  X 
2007  X  X  M  X  X  X  na  M  M  X  X  na  X  X  M  X  X  X 




a. Exportable (X), import-competing (M) and nontradables (H). 





Appendix Table 20: Annual distortion estimates, Ukraine, 1992 to 2005 
(a) Nominal rates of assistance




y    Beef   Egg   Maize   Milk   Oat  
Pigme
at   Potato  
Poultr
y   Rye   Sugar  
Sunfl




1992  -59  -19  -40  -19  -49  -61  -63  na  -48  -40  12  -47  -68  -55 
1993  28  41  -9  76  8  -6  -42  na  6  9  4  15  -34  -8 
1994  17  -19  12  45  -34  416  -36  na  15  161  3  13  75  -13 
1995  -27  -49  9  -24  -48  154  -51  na  -15  49  -49  -28  -34  -47 
1996  -8  -15  92  -9  -36  34  1  -3  -1  30  181  -21  -45  -23 
1997  -5  11  75  -23  -7  27  -9  -57  45  8  21  -22  104  4 
1998  14  -14  88  -16  -3  -23  37  -75  70  18  -1  -31  16  -1 
1999  -21  -13  42  9  -30  43  16  -65  0  41  0  -33  -16  -21 
2000  -14  7  -9  -20  -35  40  1  -57  53  11  15  -29  -43  -27 
2001  -18  6  -7  -6  -30  12  39  -46  44  37  28  5  -2  -11 
2002  -20  -8  -30  -6  -32  3  13  21  94  -4  43  -34  -9  -20 
2003  9  10  -47  14  -19  84  -30  10  66  17  63  -25  -38  -18 
2004  -10  -17  -38  -25  -17  12  -6  -20  59  2  29  -9  -21  -21 
2005  -13  19  24  -6  -5  31  64  na  86  -14  55  na  -1  10 
a. NRA estimates are taken from authors’ calculations where available, and are supplemented 




Appendix Table 20 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Ukraine, 1992 to 2005 
(b) Nominal and relative rates of assistance to all
a agricultural products, to exportable
b and 
import-competing
 b agricultural industries, and relative
c to non-agricultural industries 
        (percent) 
  
  
Total ag NRA  Ag tradables NRA 
Non-ag 
tradables 
NRA  RRA 









competing  All  Inputs  Outputs 
1992  -7  -47  -48  -46  -50  -22  -46  3  -47 
1993  -8  0  0  1  -1  5  1  2  -1 
1994  -8  -5  -5  -2  -7  6  -2  2  -4 
1995  -8  -39  -39  -38  -39  -42  -38  2  -39 
1996  -7  -16  -16  -13  -23  82  -13  2  -15 
1997  -8  11  11  13  9  29  14  3  11 
1998  -8  7  7  9  5  21  10  3  7 
1999  -7  -14  -14  -12  -15  0  -12  4  -15 
2000  -7  -20  -20  -19  -17  -27  -19  4  -22 
2001  -7  -4  -4  -3  -7  35  -3  3  -6 
2002  -7  -14  -14  -13  -18  64  -13  3  -16 
2003  -7  -11  -11  -10  -14  4  -10  3  -13 
2004  -7  -14  -14  -13  -18  43  -15  3  -18 
2005  0  10  4  8  3  77  8  3  5 
 
 
a. NRAs including assistance to nontradables and non-product specific assistance.
 
b. NRAs including products specific input subsidies.  





t are the percentage NRAs for the 




Appendix Table 20 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Ukraine, 1992 to 2004 
(c) Value shares of primary production of covered




y   Beef   Egg   Maize   Milk   Oat  
Pigme
at   Potato  
Poultr
y   Rye   Sugar  
Sunfl
ower   Wheat  
Barle




1992  5  11  3  2  12  1  9  na  3  1  2  3  14  5  11  36 
1993  6  10  4  3  12  1  9  na  2  1  7  3  15  6  10  26 
1994  4  11  4  2  17  0  11  na  2  0  7  2  5  4  11  34 
1995  2  8  2  2  15  0  8  na  2  0  8  3  7  2  8  43 
1996  4  11  2  2  25  1  9  0  3  1  2  3  19  4  11  17 
1997  6  10  3  6  21  1  14  0  3  1  5  4  8  6  10  16 
1998  3  13  3  2  23  1  11  0  3  1  6  6  11  3  13  18 
1999  5  11  3  2  26  1  8  0  4  0  4  7  11  5  11  18 
2000  6  8  4  4  21  1  8  0  2  1  3  5  17  6  8  23 
2001  8  8  4  3  20  1  7  0  2  1  3  3  14  8  8  26 
2002  6  7  4  3  18  1  6  0  1  1  2  7  11  6  7  33 
2003  5  7  7  7  20  1  8  0  2  0  2  8  6  5  7  25 
2004  6  5  6  6  17  1  5  0  2  1  2  5  13  6  5  32 
2005  7  5  6  4  20  0  4  na  3  0  2  na  12  7  5  36 











y   Beef   Egg   Maize   Milk   Oat  
Pigme
at   Potato  
Poultr
y   Rye   Sugar  
Sunfl
ower   Wheat  
1992  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  na  M  X  M  X  X 
1993  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  na  M  X  M  X  X 
1994  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  na  M  X  M  X  X 
1995  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  na  M  X  M  X  X 
1996  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  H  M  X  M  X  X 
1997  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  H  M  X  M  X  X 
1998  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  H  M  X  M  X  X 
1999  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  H  M  X  M  X  X 
2000  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  H  M  X  M  X  M 
2001  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  H  M  X  M  X  X 
2002  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  H  M  X  M  X  X 
2003  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  H  M  X  M  X  M 
2004  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  H  M  X  M  X  X 
2005  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  na  M  X  M  na  X 
Sources: von Cramon et al. (2007) and OECD (2007) 
a. Exportable (X), import-competing (M) and nontradables (H). 





Appendix Table 21: Annual distortion estimates, Europe’s transition economies, 1992 to 
2007 
(a) Nominal rates of assistance to covered products 
(percent) 
   Apple  
Barle
y   Beef  
Cotto










at   Potato  
1992  -4  -7  -19  -53  -8  31  -40  6  -14  -37  17  3  -33  34 
1993  -16  24  -10  -25  -4  16  -52  50  9  -22  23  26  -5  24 
1994  -23  8  -20  -43  24  35  -40  14  6  16  37  9  9  6 
1995  12  -21  -14  -58  53  -6  -40  -6  25  0  11  5  0  34 
1996  10  4  3  -58  40  -15  -26  1  31  27  24  26  1  62 
1997  0  7  34  -57  51  12  -45  -1  50  19  8  25  0  2 
1998  8  47  27  -32  60  33  -25  6  62  -3  14  23  32  22 
1999  1  4  14  -42  42  0  -21  8  30  -14  9  24  29  13 
2000  3  0  12  -39  11  26  -12  8  18  5  26  29  2  28 
2001  -19  -9  35  -20  14  -8  -21  18  12  -26  13  6  24  28 
2002  -1  -10  44  -22  2  30  7  0  30  -55  9  5  22  101 
2003  -1  0  51  -42  -18  30  9  38  39  -33  16  15  1  84 
2004  16  5  16  -57  12  67  na  25  46  -17  0  na  34  105 
2005  na  -7  30  na  18  na  na  9  8  -6  0  na  45  10 
2006  89  16  78  -18  39  49  na  16  42  7  0  na  30  40 
























1992  2  18  242  -25  5  24  44  -24  19  10  -26  na  -12 
1993  21  -3  248  -23  4  89  36  -10  29  9  -2  na  12 
1994  38  -25  157  19  4  45  14  -9  75  -18  17  na  14 
1995  42  -19  133  29  26  20  -1  -11  61  -31  -12  na  5 
1996  38  5  144  34  -7  22  79  -7  82  14  0  na  14 
1997  42  -9  108  24  -4  0  71  -10  58  4  20  na  21 
1998  57  -9  114  5  32  -15  86  -14  46  -13  24  na  31 
1999  33  0  54  -9  21  -9  85  -20  -4  -36  9  na  13 
2000  43  4  100  27  10  -4  69  -18  -20  -1  -4  na  6 
2001  53  14  69  1  -11  28  43  2  -31  -16  0  na  -89 
2002  64  13  123  -37  5  19  75  -20  -16  -19  -2  na  12 
2003  50  53  99  -31  11  -7  103  -18  6  5  15  na  16 
2004  89  0  na  8  3  -2  114  -2  2  -20  5  na  19 
2005  84  0  2  -11  -35  -6  79  -3  na  0  -5  2  18 
2006  61  0  3  na  11  -9  41  7  20  -35  11  1  22 




Appendix Table 21 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Europe’s transition economies, 
1992 to 2007 
(b) Nominal and relative rates of assistance to all
a agricultural products, to exportable
b and 
import-competing
 b agricultural industries, and relative
c to non-agricultural industries 
        (percent) 
  
 
Total ag NRA  Ag tradables NRA 
Non-ag 
tradables 
NRA  RRA 









competing  All  Inputs  Outputs 
1992  5  -17  -8  -9  -18  -5  -9  8  -16 
1993  6  3  10  10  5  7  10  8  3 
1994  10  3  6  12  -2  12  12  7  5 
1995  7  -1  0  5  -15  19  6  6  -1 
1996  6  9  14  16  -4  29  16  5  11 
1997  4  17  20  24  0  44  24  6  17 
1998  4  28  33  37  13  52  37  5  30 
1999  4  12  16  19  2  32  19  4  14 
2000  2  7  13  14  -1  19  13  5  8 
2001  2  10  10  13  -6  29  13  5  7 
2002  3  14  15  17  -2  44  17  5  11 
2003  3  17  20  21  -3  43  19  5  13 
2004  1  22  23  21  6  43  14  4  10 
2005  0  17  23  18  6  31  11  4  6 
2006  0  26  na  18  19  43  20  2  17 
2007  0  18  na  14  18  18  16  2  14 
 
 
a. NRAs including assistance to nontradables and non-product specific assistance.
 
b. NRAs including products specific input subsidies.  





t are the percentage NRAs for the 




Appendix Table 21 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Europe’s transition economies, 
1992 to 2007 
(c) Value shares of primary production of covered
a and non-covered products,  
(percent) 
   apple  barley  beef  cotton  egg  grape 
hazeln






at  potato 
1992  1  4  7  2  3  1  1  2  10  1  0  1  11  1 
1993  1  3  8  1  3  1  1  2  10  1  0  1  9  1 
1994  1  3  8  2  3  1  1  2  11  1  0  1  8  1 
1995  1  3  7  3  2  1  1  2  10  1  0  1  8  1 
1996  1  3  7  3  3  1  1  3  11  1  0  1  9  1 
1997  1  4  6  3  3  1  1  3  10  1  0  1  9  1 
1998  1  2  6  3  3  1  2  2  10  0  0  1  8  1 
1999  1  3  6  2  3  2  1  3  11  0  0  1  6  1 
2000  1  3  5  2  3  1  1  2  12  0  0  1  7  1 
2001  1  4  5  2  3  1  1  3  13  1  0  1  7  1 
2002  1  3  4  2  4  1  1  3  12  1  0  1  7  1 
2003  1  3  4  2  5  1  0  3  11  1  0  1  7  1 
2004  1  3  5  3  4  1  na  3  12  1  0  na  6  1 
2005  na  4  6  na  4  na  na  4  13  1  0  na  8  2 
2006  1  3  3  2  2  3  na  4  8  0  0  na  5  3 
























1992  3  0  0  1  1  0  2  2  1  1  10  na  34 
1993  3  0  0  1  1  0  2  2  1  2  10  na  35 
1994  3  0  0  0  1  0  2  1  0  2  7  na  38 
1995  2  0  0  0  1  0  2  2  0  2  8  na  42 
1996  3  0  0  1  1  0  2  1  1  2  11  na  36 
1997  3  0  0  1  1  0  2  1  1  1  11  na  35 
1998  3  0  0  0  1  0  2  2  1  3  8  na  38 
1999  3  0  0  0  1  0  1  2  1  3  8  na  39 
2000  3  0  0  0  1  0  1  2  1  2  10  na  39 
2001  3  0  0  1  1  0  2  1  0  2  12  na  37 
2002  3  0  0  1  1  0  1  2  0  2  10  na  40 
2003  3  0  0  0  1  0  1  2  0  2  8  na  43 
2004  3  0  na  0  1  0  1  2  0  2  11  na  41 
2005  3  1  0  0  0  0  1  1  na  0  10  1  41 
2006  3  1  0  na  2  0  1  2  0  3  8  1  43 
2007  3  2  0  na  1  0  1  2  0  5  10  2  37 
a.  At farmgate undistorted prices. 




Appendix Table 22: Annual distortion estimates, CEE-10, 1992 to 2007 




y  Beef  Egg 
Maiz

























1992  -11  10  33  7  4  -29  17  -19  23  34  18  na  0  -5  24  65  -24  na  -3  na  0 
1993  38  -7  34  50  22  6  23  6  15  29  -3  na  -24  -32  89  49  -23  na  22  na  16 
1994  16  -2  48  7  21  -10  37  18  -7  49  -25  na  -14  -36  45  39  -22  na  10  na  15 
1995  -21  2  60  -9  26  -4  11  3  -2  40  -19  na  16  -3  20  40  -20  na  -14  na  7 
1996  -10  10  38  -4  25  14  24  -6  17  37  5  na  11  -38  22  50  -11  na  5  na  9 
1997  -4  3  49  -4  35  36  8  -11  52  33  -9  na  27  -29  0  58  -19  na  1  na  8 
1998  24  22  83  -4  77  36  14  27  3  54  -9  na  57  -5  -15  85  -16  na  12  na  33 
1999  1  2  78  2  45  52  9  29  9  37  0  na  86  -31  -9  98  -16  na  11  na  25 
2000  -5  -6  40  9  38  62  26  0  35  31  4  na  41  -38  -4  95  -4  na  16  na  17 
2001  4  18  39  22  37  75  13  12  21  44  14  na  22  -2  28  71  -10  na  16  na  23 
2002  7  18  22  0  49  1  9  9  83  62  13  na  -9  -7  19  90  -10  na  7  na  22 
2003  4  7  2  51  59  66  16  -6  86  48  53  na  7  -12  -7  119  -13  na  16  na  24 
2004  12  -79  31  44  97  42  0  37  10  112  0  na  na  -5  -2  194  -12  na  12  na  41 
2005  1  87  38  20  35  29  0  35  10  69  0  2  na  -35  -6  170  -3  0  0  2  25 
2006  0  64  34  5  40  7  0  30  10  73  0  3  na  -43  -9  67  -5  0  -5  1  20 






Appendix Table 22 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, CEE-10, 1992 to 2007 
(b) Nominal and relative rates of assistance to all
a agricultural products, to exporAppendix 
Table
b and import-competing
 b agricultural industries, and relative
c to non-agricultural 
industries          (percent) 
  
 
Total ag NRA  Ag tradables NRA 
Non-ag 
tradables 
NRA  RRA 









competing  All  Inputs  Outputs 
1992  4  -2  na  0  -9  13  0  5  -4 
1993  4  16  na  19  11  21  19  7  12 
1994  5  15  na  18  6  23  19  6  13 
1995  4  6  na  9  -3  20  9  6  3 
1996  4  8  na  11  2  24  11  5  6 
1997  3  7  na  11  3  20  11  6  4 
1998  5  33  na  38  18  54  38  5  31 
1999  5  24  na  29  15  42  29  2  26 
2000  5  17  na  20  4  31  21  3  17 
2001  5  22  na  25  2  41  25  4  20 
2002  6  21  na  24  10  50  24  5  18 
2003  6  23  na  26  2  48  26  5  20 
2004  2  41  na  36  38  56  35  4  30 
2005  0  25  na  26  17  52  18  3  14 
2006  0  20  na  15  12  33  13  4  9 
2007  0  11  na  11  11  12  10  4  6 
 
 
a. NRAs including assistance to nontradables and non-product specific assistance.
 
b. NRAs including products specific input subsidies.  





t are the percentage NRAs for the 




Appendix Table 22 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, CEE-10, 1992 to 2007 
(c) Value shares of primary production of covered




y  Beef  Egg 
Maiz

























1992  2  6  3  4  12  0  0  22  0  4  0  na  0  1  0  1  1  na  7  na  34 
1993  2  7  3  4  11  0  0  16  0  3  0  na  0  2  0  2  1  na  8  na  39 
1994  2  7  3  5  11  0  0  15  1  3  0  na  0  1  0  1  1  na  8  na  39 
1995  2  5  2  5  11  0  1  15  1  3  0  na  0  1  0  2  1  na  9  na  42 
1996  2  5  3  6  11  0  0  16  0  4  0  na  0  1  0  2  1  na  9  na  39 
1997  3  5  3  6  10  0  0  17  0  4  1  na  0  1  0  2  1  na  10  na  37 
1998  2  6  3  5  11  0  1  16  0  4  1  na  0  1  0  2  2  na  9  na  38 
1999  2  5  3  7  13  0  1  13  0  5  1  na  0  1  0  1  2  na  8  na  40 
2000  2  4  3  4  13  0  1  14  0  4  1  na  0  1  0  1  1  na  8  na  41 
2001  2  3  3  6  14  0  1  14  0  5  1  na  0  1  0  1  1  na  10  na  39 
2002  2  3  3  6  12  0  1  13  0  4  1  na  0  1  0  1  2  na  8  na  41 
2003  2  3  4  5  12  0  1  14  0  5  1  na  0  1  0  1  2  na  6  na  42 
2004  2  3  4  7  11  0  0  13  0  4  1  na  na  1  0  1  3  na  10  na  39 
2005  3  3  3  6  6  0  0  11  4  3  2  0  na  1  0  0  2  1  9  1  43 
2006  3  3  3  6  7  1  0  9  4  3  2  0  na  1  0  1  3  1  8  1  45 
2007  5  2  3  4  9  1  0  8  7  3  3  0  na  0  0  0  2  2  13  3  34 
a.  At farmgate undistorted prices. 




Appendix Table 23: Shares of the global value of production and consumption of key 
agricultural products, Europe’s transition economies, 2000-04  
(percent) 
 
         Bulgaria  Estonia  Hungary  Latvia  Lithuania  Poland  Romania  Russia  Slovakia  Slovenia  Turkey  Ukraine  CzechRep  Regional  World 
Grains  Q  0.2  0.0  0.4  0.0  0.1  0.4  0.6  2.0  0.1  0.0  1.3  1.0  0.2  6.2  100 
    C  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.5  0.9  0.0  0.0  0.8  0.4  0.1  3.1  100 
   Rice  Q                                0.1        0.1  100 
      C                                0.1        0.1  100 
   Wheat  Q  0.5  0.0  0.5  0.1  0.2  1.3  0.8  4.8  0.2  0.0  3.4  2.0  0.5  14.3  100 
      C  0.2  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.1  0.5  0.4  1.7  0.1  0.0  1.4  0.6  0.2  5.3  100 
   Maize  Q  0.2     0.9        0.2  1.5  0.4  0.1  0.0  0.4  0.9     4.6  100 
      C  0.3     0.9        0.3  3.7  0.6  0.1  0.1  1.3  1.0     8.4  100 
   Cassava  Q                                            100 
      C                                            100 
   Barley  Q  0.6  0.2  0.7  0.1  0.5     0.7  8.5  0.4  0.0  5.5  4.8  1.3  23.3  100 
      C  0.5  0.2  0.7  0.2  0.7     1.0  7.7  0.4  0.1  7.2  3.4  1.2  23.2  100 
   Oat  Q     0.2     0.3  0.3     1.2  22.6  0.1        3.0     27.8  100 
      C     0.3     0.3  0.4     2.0  17.1  0.1        3.7     24.0  100 
   Chickpea  Q                                            100 
      C                                            100 
Oilseeds  Q  0.2     0.2        0.2  0.4  1.0  0.1     0.3  0.9  0.2  3.6  100 
      C  0.2     0.2        0.2  0.4  0.9  0.1     0.4  0.7  na  3.3  100 
   Soybean  Q                    0.1                    0.1  100 
      C                    0.1                    0.1  100 
   Rapeseed  Q                 2.0  0.1     0.3           1.6  4.1  100 
      C                 #VALUE!  na     na           na  na  100 
   Sunflower  Q  3.1     2.8        na  4.5  12.4  0.6     3.8  11.8     39.1  100 
      C  2.1     3.1           4.5  11.9  0.4     5.7  9.8     37.4  100 
   Sesame  Q                                            100 
      C                                            100 
Tropical crops  Q  0.0     0.0  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.0  0.5  0.0  0.0  3.9  0.4  0.1  5.3  100 
      C  0.0     0.1  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.1  1.6  0.0  0.0  8.1  0.4  0.1  10.8  100 
   Sugar  Q  0.0     0.1  0.3  0.5  0.5  0.0  1.4  0.1  0.0  1.6  1.2  0.3  6.1  100 
      C  0.0     0.3  0.4  0.5  0.5  0.2  5.3  0.1  0.0  1.4  1.4  0.3  10.5  100 
   Cotton  Q                                14.2        14.2  100 
      C                                31.6        31.6  100 
Livestock products  Q  0.1  0.0  0.3  0.0  0.1  1.0  0.4  2.0  0.1  0.0  0.7  0.9  0.2  6.1  100 
      C  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.4  0.2  1.3  0.1  0.0  0.4  0.4  0.1  3.2  100 
   Pigmeat  Q  0.1  0.0  0.5  0.0  0.1  2.1  0.6  1.6  0.1  0.1     0.7  0.4  6.4  100 
      C  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.1  0.4  0.0  0.0     0.1  0.1  1.2  100 
   Milk  Q  0.3  0.1  0.3  0.1  0.3  1.6  0.7  4.2  0.1  0.1  1.3  2.1  0.4  11.6  100 
      C  0.2  0.1  0.3  0.1  0.3  1.6  0.8  4.0  0.1  0.1  1.3  1.7  0.4  11.0  100 
   Beef  Q  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.4  0.3  2.1  0.1  0.0  0.8  0.9  0.2  4.9  100 
      C  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.3  0.4  4.3  0.1  0.1  1.2  1.2  0.2  8.1  100 
   Poultry  Q  0.1  0.0  0.6  0.0  0.0  0.8  0.3  1.3  0.1  0.1  1.0  0.4  0.2  4.8  100 
      C  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.1  1.1  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.2  0.1  2.2  100 
   Egg  Q  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.3  1.6  0.0  0.0  0.4  0.5  0.1  3.4  100 
      C  0.1  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.4  2.1  0.1  0.0  0.5  0.6  0.2  4.6  100 
   Sheepmeat  Q  0.3     0.1        0.0  0.6        0.0  2.1        3.1  100 
    C  0.3    0.1      0.0  0.7      0.0  2.9      4.1  100 
Total of above 
products  Q  0.2  0.0  0.3  0.0  0.1  0.7  0.5  1.8  0.1  0.0  1.1  0.9  0.2  5.9  100 
      C  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.3  1.2  0.0  0.0  0.8  0.4  0.1  3.5  100 
Production only                                              
All covered  Q  0.2  0.0  0.3  0.0  0.1  0.8  0.5  2.0  0.1  0.0  1.9  1.0  0.2  7.2  100 
Non-covered  Q  0.3  0.0  0.2  0.1  0.1  1.5  0.7  2.6  0.1  0.0  3.3  0.8  0.2  9.9  100 





Source: Authors’ calculations using Project data and FAO Production and Commodity 




Appendix Table 24: Share of global exports and imports, key covered products, Europe’s 
transition economies, 2000-03 
(percent) 
         Bulgaria  Estonia  Hungary  Latvia  Lithuania  Poland  Romania  Russia  Slovakia  Slovenia  Turkey  Ukraine  CzechRep  Regional  World 
Grains  X  0.3  0.0  0.9  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1  1.7  0.1  0.0  0.4  1.4  0.2  5.2  100 
    M  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.3  0.5  0.1  0.1  1.0  0.5  0.0  2.9  100 
   Rice  X                                0.0        0.0  100 
      M                                1.3        1.3  100 
   Wheat  X  0.4  0.0  0.8  0.1  0.3  0.2  0.1  2.9  0.0  0.0  0.6  1.7  0.3  7.5  100 
      M  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.5  0.7  0.0  0.1  0.9  0.9  0.0  3.4  100 
   Maize  X  0.1     1.9        0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.6     3.0  100 
      M  0.2     0.1        0.4  0.2  0.5  0.1  0.2  1.4  0.2     3.4  100 
   Cassava  X                                            100 
      M                                            100 
   Barley  X  0.8  0.0  0.5  0.0  0.1     0.6  6.5  0.1  0.0  1.3  6.9  0.4  17.2  100 
      M  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.0  0.1     0.4  1.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.2  3.5  100 
   Oat  X     0.1     0.1  0.0     0.0  0.1  0.0        0.5     0.8  100 
      M     0.1     0.2  0.1     0.0  0.7  0.0        0.1     1.3  100 
   Chickpea  X                                            100 
      M                                            100 
Oilseeds  X  0.2     0.4           0.2  0.4  0.1     0.1  1.5  0.3  3.1  100 
      M  0.0     0.1           0.1  0.3  0.0     0.4  0.0  0.0  0.9  100 
   Soybean  X                    0.0                    0.0  100 
      M                    0.2                    0.2  100 
   Rapeseed  X                    0.2     0.5           2.7  3.4  100 
      M                    0.0     0.1           0.2  0.3  100 
   Sunflower  X  2.1     5.0           2.0  4.6  0.8     0.8  18.6     33.9  100 
      M  0.3     0.7           0.5  4.2  0.2     4.8  0.1     10.9  100 
Tropical 
crops  X  0.0     0.0  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.5  0.1  0.1  1.3  100 
      M  0.2     0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.4  3.5  0.1  0.0  1.1  0.6  0.0  6.0  100 
   Sugar  X  0.0     0.1  0.0  0.1  0.8  0.0  0.4  0.1  0.0  1.1  0.4  0.2  3.2  100 
      M  0.5     0.1  0.0  0.0  0.2  1.1  9.1  0.2  0.1  0.0  1.5  0.1  12.9  100 
   Cotton  X                                0.8        0.8  100 
      M                                8.0        8.0  100 
Livestock 
products  X  0.1  0.1  0.9  0.1  0.2  0.9  0.0  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.6  0.3  3.8  100 
      M  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.3  0.2  2.8  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.2  4.5  100 
   Pigmeat  X  0.0  0.1  1.7  0.0  0.0  0.9  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1     0.1  0.1  3.3  100 
      M  0.1  0.1  0.3  0.2  0.1  0.4  0.5  3.2  0.2  0.3     0.0  0.3  5.6  100 
   Milk  X  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.2  0.6  1.2  0.0  0.4  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.7  0.7  4.9  100 
      M  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.4  0.1  1.5  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.3  3.2  100 
   Beef  X  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  1.4  0.1  2.3  100 
      M  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1  3.4  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  3.8  100 
   Poultry  X  0.2  0.1  2.7  0.0  0.0  1.3  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.0  0.2  5.0  100 
      M  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.3  0.1  0.2  0.5  6.3  0.2  0.1  0.0  0.4  0.3  8.7  100 
   Egg  X  0.3  0.0  1.4  0.2  0.2  0.7  0.1  0.5  0.2  0.2  0.8  0.0  0.6  5.1  100 
      M  0.1  0.1  0.9  0.1  0.2  0.4  0.3  0.5  0.1  0.1  0.7  0.5  0.2  4.2  100 
   Sheepmeat  X        0.1        0.0           0.0  0.1        0.2  100 
    M      0.0      0.0        0.0  0.0      0.0  100 
Total of 
above 
products  X  0.1  0.1  0.7  0.1  0.2  0.5  0.1  0.6  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.8  0.3  3.7  100 
      M  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.2  0.3  2.1  0.1  0.1  0.5  0.3  0.1  3.9  100 
All agriculture  X  0.1  0.1  0.6  0.1  0.1  0.7  0.1  0.4  0.1  0.1  0.9  0.5  0.3  4.0  100 
      M  0.1  0.1  0.3  0.2  0.1  0.7  0.3  1.9  0.2  0.2  0.7  0.3  0.5  5.5  100 
Source: Authors’ derivation using production, trade and domestic supply data in the FAO 
Commodity Balances at FAOSTAT.  